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TO THE PEOPLE:  ENHANCING LEAHY LAW 
HUMAN RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT THROUGH 
A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A sudden burst of machine-gun fire tore through the walls of Alfonso 
Bolivar Tuberquia’s home in rural Colombia.1  Seconds later, a grenade 
exploded, killing his wife, Sandra.2  Alfonso’s two young children 
miraculously survived the hail of bullets and shrapnel, prompting 
paramilitary commanders and their Colombian military allies to callously 
discuss what to do with the children.3  “Assassinate the kids, but silently,” 
a paramilitary commander ordered.4  A paramilitary fighter complied; he 
“took the child by the hair and slit her throat with a machete.”5  In total, 
eight civilians, including three children, were brutally massacred before 
paramilitaries and troops from the Colombian military’s Seventeenth 
Brigade marched out of San José de Apartadó.6  Days after the massacre, 
community members and human rights organizations alerted the U.S. 
State Department to the ruthless killings and the role of the Seventeenth 
Brigade.7  The Colombian military’s reported involvement in the massacre 
should have triggered the Leahy Law (“Leahy”), requiring at least a 
                                                
1 See Nadja Drost, San Jose Apartado Massacre:  Murder of Colombia's Peace Community, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/16/san-jose-
apartado-massacr_n_501243.html [https://perma.cc/4BLA-UAL4] (depicting the joint 
attack by Colombian Army troops and right-wing paramilitaries on the civilian community 
of San José de Apartadó). 
2 See id. (detailing the grenade attack that killed Sandra Milena Muñoz). 
3 See id. (explaining that the children emerged from the house after the initial attack and 
quoting a paramilitary fighter who participated in the killings, recalling that Alfonso 
“begged our commanders to please not kill the kids, that if they wanted to [they could] kill 
him but leave the kids alive”). 
4 Id. 
5 ¿Qué Pasó en San José de Apartadó Hace 8 Años?, CENTRO NACIONAL DE MEMORIA 
HISTÓRICA (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/component/ 
content/article/23-noticias/noticias-cmh/783-ique-paso-en-san-jose-de-apartado-hace-8-
anos [https://perma.cc/VB7G-DJ64]. 
6 See id. (describing the presence of the Colombian military along with paramilitaries in 
San José de Apartadó); La Condena a Cuatro Militares por la Masacre de San José de Apartadó, 
VERDAD ABIERTA (June 14, 2012), http://www.verdadabierta.com/component/ 
content/article/75-das-gate/4060-revocan-parcialmente-sentencia-por-la-masacre-de-san-
jose-de-apartado/ [https://perma.cc/N2LH-J2RJ] (reporting that the Superior Court of 
Antioquia found four Colombian soldiers guilty of conspiracy for joining paramilitaries on 
a patrol that ended in the San José de Apartadó killings). 
7 See Ambassador Meets with Peace Community about Uraba Massacre, U.S. EMBASSY, BOGOTÁ 
(Mar. 18, 2005), https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05BOGOTA2619_a.html 
[https://perma.cc/5CPE-LGBC] (recounting a March 16, 2005, meeting between San José de 
Apartadó community members, human rights advocates, the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, 
and additional Embassy staff). 
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temporary prohibition on U.S. military assistance to the Seventeenth 
Brigade.8  However, in contravention to Leahy, the Seventeenth Brigade 
received U.S. security assistance the year following the massacre.9 
The United States annually spends twenty-five billion dollars on 
military assistance for foreign security forces.10  Two statutes, 22 U.S.C. 
§ 2304 and Leahy, are designed to bar military assistance to foreign 
security forces with credible allegations of human rights abuses.11  Yet, 
Leahy, enacted to replace the failed § 2304, has not fully achieved its goal 
of withholding assistance to foreign security forces responsible for serious 
human rights abuses.12 
This Note argues that Congress could substantially mitigate obstacles 
to enforcing human rights conditions on foreign security assistance by 
providing human rights victims with a private cause of action to enjoin 
                                                
8 See 22 U.S.C. § 2378d(a) (2012) (prohibiting security assistance to units of foreign 
security forces when credible information indicates that they have committed a gross 
violation of human rights and the government is not effectively bringing the alleged 
perpetrator(s) to justice). 
9 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION, ASSISTING UNITS 
THAT COMMIT EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS:  A CALL TO INVESTIGATE US MILITARY POLICY 
TOWARD COLOMBIA 6–7 (2008) [hereinafter AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL] (quoting a statement 
from the State Department confirming that a member of the Seventeenth Brigade was “given 
a medical assistance training in 2006”). 
10 See INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, REPORT ON 
SECURITY CAPACITY BUILDING 1 (2013) (explaining that the United States spends twenty-five 
billion dollars annually on security assistance to “improve the ‘security capacity’ of the 
recipient states”).  Some U.S. security assistance reaches human rights abusers despite 
statutory restrictions on aid to abusive militaries.  See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra 
note 9, at 6–13 (collecting examples of Colombian military units receiving security assistance 
despite human rights concerns). 
11 See § 2304(a)(2) (requiring a suspension of U.S. security assistance to any country that 
“engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human 
rights”); § 2378d(a) (compelling a suspension of U.S. security assistance “to any unit of the 
security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible information that such 
unit has committed a gross violation of human rights”). 
12 See infra Part II.B (examining the two key statutory measures that restrict security 
assistance to foreign security forces based on human rights criteria, as well as the limitations 
to judicial enforcement of the statutes).  For example, the Colombian security forces received 
$6.9 billion in military assistance between 2000 and 2014 despite reports by human rights 
organizations and the State Department of systematic and gross human rights violations by 
Colombian security forces.  See, e.g., WINIFRED TATE, COUNTING THE DEAD:  THE CULTURE 
AND POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISM IN COLOMBIA 266 (2007) (clarifying that, while 
several Colombian battalions saw U.S. security assistance suspended due to Leahy, human 
rights groups insisted that Leahy was “not being fully implemented”); Nathanael Tenorio 
Miller, Note, The Leahy Law:  Congressional Failure, Executive Overreach, and the Consequences, 
45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 667, 685 (2012) (arguing that human rights data suggested that Leahy 
was nearly a “categorical failure” in Colombia because U.S. security assistance continued 
despite documented human rights abuses by the Colombian military). 
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the State Department to enforce Leahy.13  Part II examines the statutory 
framework undergirding limitations on U.S. assistance to foreign 
militaries that engage in human rights violations.14  Part III analyzes 
Leahy’s purpose, enforcement mechanisms, and the lack of a judicial 
remedy available to enforce human rights restrictions on foreign aid.15  
Finally, Part IV proposes that Congress expand the Torture Victim 
Protection Act’s (“TVPA”) private cause of action to allow victims to seek 
injunctive relief against the State Department to enforce Leahy.16 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Since the United States declared independence, policymakers have 
struggled to determine the proper role for human rights concerns in U.S. 
foreign policy.17  Efforts to legislate a role for human rights in decisions 
regarding U.S. security assistance to foreign security forces beginning in 
the 1970s were stymied by executive branch neglect.18  In 1997, Congress 
                                                
13 See infra Part IV (analyzing how a private cause of action to enforce Leahy could 
enhance Leahy’s effectiveness). 
14 See infra Part II (scrutinizing the two key statutory measures that restrict security 
assistance to foreign security forces based on human rights criteria, as well as the limitations 
to judicial enforcement of the statutes). 
15 See infra Part III (evaluating Leahy’s purpose, statutory context, and the unavailability 
of judicial enforcement of Leahy provisions). 
16 See infra Part IV (proposing a private cause of action to enforce Leahy). 
17 See M. Glen Johnson, Historical Perspectives on Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2 
UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS No. 3, 2 (1980) (explaining that the founding fathers viewed the 
development of the United States as a triumph of liberty over tyranny and that this was a 
model for the rest of the world); see also David Weissbrodt, Human Rights Legislation and U.S. 
Foreign Policy, 7 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 231, 232–37 (1977) (describing the history of human 
rights in foreign policy); PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS 205–06 (2003) (examining the role of the United States in the development of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights); William A. Fletcher, International Human Rights and 
the Role of the United States, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 293, 296 (2010) (analyzing the role of the United 
States in international human rights); Peter S. Michaels, Note, Lawless Intervention:  United 
States Foreign Policy in El Salvador and Nicaragua, 7 B. C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 223, 227 (1987) 
(recognizing the United States’s willingness to turn a blind eye to human rights concerns in 
foreign affairs).  Human rights promotion during the founding period was typically 
narrowly focused on the United States as an example of human rights exceptionalism for the 
rest of the world to emulate.  See Johnson, supra note 17, at 2 (quoting Paul A. Varg) 
(“Americans prided themselves on being the model republican society that the rest of the 
world would emulate.”).  International human rights advocacy has never been the exclusive 
domain of the U.S. government, and human rights advocacy and activism in the United 
States began shortly after independence.  See GORDON LAUREN, supra note 17, at 37 
(highlighting a citizen-led effort shortly after independence to end the international slave 
trade and domestic slavery). 
18 See Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 46, 88 Stat. 1815 (1974) (creating the legislation that would be 
codified as 22 U.S.C. § 2304); see also Weissbrodt, supra note 17, at 238 (detailing § 2304’s 
genesis, implementation, and early impact).  Section 502B was not Congress’s first foray into 
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passed Leahy, which has proven more successful, if imperfect.19  Yet, any 
attempt to effectuate enhanced Leahy enforcement in federal court would 
be blocked by the political question and standing doctrines.20 
First, Part II.A describes § 2304, Leahy’s predecessor and Congress’s 
first attempt to condition security assistance on human rights 
performance.21  Second, Part II.B introduces Leahy, explaining the 
statute’s provisions, its implementation mechanism, and its 
effectiveness.22  Finally, Part II.C summarizes the obstacles to judicial 
enforcement of Leahy and describes the TVPA, including its private cause 
of action to sue foreign nationals for civil damages for torture or 
extrajudicial killings.23 
                                                
legislating respect for human rights in foreign policy.  See Weissbrodt, supra note 17, at 241 
(describing Congress’s first effort as “tentative, noncoercive[,] and limited”).  Before 
amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to add § 502B, Congress passed the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1973 with a provision requiring that the President deny economic and 
military assistance to countries holding political prisoners.  Pub. L. No. 93-189, § 32, 87 Stat. 
714 (1973).  The provision stated that “[i]t is the sense of Congress that the President should 
deny any economic or military assistance to the government of any foreign country which 
practices the internment or imprisonment of that country’s citizens for political purposes.”  
Id.  The State Department largely ignored § 32, which prompted Congress’s more 
comprehensive action a year later, passing § 502B.  Weissbrodt, supra note 17, at 241. 
19 See 22 U.S.C. § 2378d(a) (2012) (restricting U.S. security assistance to units of a foreign 
security force if credible information indicates that the unit has committed a gross violation 
of human rights); Winifred Tate, Human Rights Law and Military Aid Delivery:  A Case Study of 
the Leahy Law, 34 POLAR:  POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 337, 340 (2011) (explaining that 
human rights advocates and congressional staff began to discuss alternatives to § 2304 due 
to frustrations over the statutes failures); Linwood Ham, Human Rights Violations:  U.S. 
Foreign Aid for Accountability and Prevention, U.S. INST. OF PEACE (Mar. 29, 2015), 
http://www.usip.org/olivebranch/2015/03/29/human-rights-violations-us-foreign-aid-
accountability-and-prevention [https://perma.cc/U4L9-EMDK] (recounting Senator 
Leahy’s statement that the failure of the Executive Branch to enforce § 2304 led him to seek 
an alternative approach that would be more effective). 
20 See infra Part II.C (providing an overview of the obstacles to judicial enforcement of 
Leahy); see also Abusharar v. Hagel, 77 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1006 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (barring 
judicial review of the State Department’s determination pursuant to Leahy to allow U.S. 
military assistance to the Israeli military based on the political question doctrine and the 
court’s determination that the claimant lacked standing).  A political question is a “question 
that a court will not consider because it involves the exercise of discretionary power by the 
executive or legislative branch of government.”  Political Question, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014) [hereinafter BLACK’S Political Question].  Standing is “[a] party’s right to make 
a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.”  Standing, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) [hereinafter BLACK’S Standing]. 
21 See infra Part II.A (providing an overview of the development, implementation, and 
failures of § 2304 of a human rights mechanism). 
22 See infra Part II.B (introducing Leahy, including the statutory language, the State 
Department’s role in implementing the statute, and the statutes effectiveness in barring 
human rights assistance to abusive foreign security forces). 
23 See infra Part II.C (reviewing key cases, analyzing the political question doctrine and the 
standing doctrine, introducing the only case in which a plaintiff sought an injunction against 
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A. Section 2304:  Congress’s First Effort to Condition Security Assistance on 
Human Rights Performance 
Despite early signs of interest at the dawn of the nation, human rights 
were largely ignored in foreign policy until the twentieth century; 
thereafter, human rights concerns became a foreign policy tool that was 
wielded unevenly.24  By 1974, the executive branch’s inattention to 
                                                
the State Department for failing to withhold foreign security assistance through Leahy 
implementation, and describing the Torture Victim Protection Act’s (“TVPA”) provision 
creating a private cause of action allowing the victims of human rights abuses abroad to sue 
foreign nationals in U.S. courts for damages). 
24 See Johnson, supra note 17, at 3 (observing that soon after the founding, the isolationist 
views of Hamilton and the Federalist prevailed).  By 1832, economic and commercial 
expansion were the focus of U.S. foreign policy, and human rights promotion “played an 
insignificant role.”  Id. at 4.  Between the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth 
century, U.S. foreign policy on human rights narrowly focused on the rights of self-
governance and freedom of religion.  See Weissbrodt, supra note 17, at 232 (positing that the 
genesis of human rights as a foreign policy concern is the promotion of self-governance and 
freedom of religion).  The period immediately following World War II has been described as 
a “magical period” for human rights, with some arguing that the United States played a key 
role in the era’s achievements.  Fletcher, supra note 17, at 296.  The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights was a crowning achievement of that period, and many point to the important 
role played by Eleanor Roosevelt to suggest the United States was a central player in the 
human rights developments of the period. See GORDON LAUREN, supra note 17, at 205–06 
(explaining the role of the United States in the development of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights); see also Fletcher, supra note 17, at 296 (depicting Eleanor Roosevelt’s 
extraordinary leadership in getting the Declaration approved).  There was a great deal of 
organized activism in support of both the United Nations charter and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.  See GORDON LAUREN, supra note 17, at 170–71 (detailing the 
unprecedented influence of the organizations and individuals who lobbied for “a people’s 
peace”).  However, even Ms. Roosevelt required the persistent advocacy of human rights 
activists.  See id. at 206 (noting that as Ms. Roosevelt received advocacy letters from 
concerned individuals, Ms. Roosevelt told her colleagues that these advocates “look upon 
us . . . as their representatives”). 
 During the Cold War, human rights were once again subordinated to national security 
goals.  See Weissbrodt, supra note 17, at 234–35 (stating that during the Cold War, U.S. human 
rights concerns were selective, with vociferous protestations against human rights abuses in 
Soviet-backed countries while largely ignoring abuses committed by allies); see also Louis 
Henkin, A Post-Cold War Human Rights Agenda, 19 YALE J. INT’L L. 249, 252 (1994) (recognizing 
that U.S. policymakers regularly subordinated human rights concerns during the Cold War 
in favor of the “war effort”).  Policymakers in Washington ignored human rights abuses 
committed by allies or even supported abusive regimes with military assistance.  See 
Weissbrodt, supra note 17, at 234–35 (highlighting that during this period the United States 
condemned human rights abuses by Communist governments in Eastern Europe, North 
Korea, Tibet, and Cuba while ignoring abuses in Algeria, South Africa, Indonesia, Burundi, 
Pakistan, and Sudan).  The U.S. government also channeled military assistance and sold 
weapons to allies with deficient human rights records.  See, e.g., PETER KORNBLUH, THE 
PINOCHET FILE:  A DECLASSIFIED DOSSIER ON ATROCITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 213–14 (2003) 
(observing that just three years after the coup d’etat that brought Pinochet and the military 
junta to power, Chile was the fifth largest global arms purchaser from the United States 
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international human rights led Congress to legislate a human rights 
framework for foreign relations by amending the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961 to create § 2304.25  Section 2304 was enacted and amended in an 
effort to ensure that human rights would be a focus of U.S. foreign 
policy.26  Only one provision of § 2304 is relevant for purposes of this Note:  
the legislation’s human rights restrictions on U.S. military assistance.27 
                                                
despite widespread human rights abuses); Michaels, supra note 17, at 223, 227 (suggesting 
that the 1.5 million dollars in daily military aid provided to El Salvador was illegal due to 
the gross violations of human rights committed by the Salvadoran military and paramilitary 
death squads). 
25 See Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 46, 88 Stat. 1815 (1974) (creating the legislation that would be 
codified as 22 U.S.C. § 2304); see also Jerome J. Shestack, Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy:  
Retrospect and Prospect, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 907, 907 (1987–88) (noting that twenty-five years after 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, human rights had become a “non-starter” in 
U.S. foreign policy); Patricia M. Derian, Human Rights in American Foreign Policy, 55 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 264, 272 (1979–80) (indicating that Congress’s action on human rights was due 
to inattention to the issue by the executive branch); Weissbrodt, supra note 17, at 238 (positing 
that the State Department’s unwillingness to give human rights a more significant role in 
foreign policy spurred Congress to take action).  Section 502B was not Congress’s first foray 
into legislating respect for human rights in foreign policy.  See Weissbrodt, supra note 17, at 
241 (characterizing the first efforts of Congress as “tentative, noncoercive[,] and limited”).  
Congress had expressed concern “over the rampant violations of human rights and the need 
for a more effective response from both the United States and the world community.”  Human 
Rights in the World Community:  A Call for U.S. Leadership:  Report of the Subcommittee on 
International Organizations and Movement of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong. 
(1974).  Prior to amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to add § 502B, Congress passed 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 with a provision requiring that the President deny 
economic and military assistance to countries holding political prisoners.  Pub. L. No. 93-189, 
§ 32, 87 Stat. 714 (1973).  The provision stated that “it is the sense of Congress that the 
President should deny any economic or military assistance to the government of any foreign 
country which practices the internment or imprisonment of that country’s citizens for 
political purposes.”  Id.  The State Department largely ignored § 32, which prompted 
Congress’s more comprehensive action a year later, passing § 502B.  See Weissbrodt, supra 
note 17, at 241 (clarifying that it was State Department’s inaction that led to Congress 
redoubling its efforts to spur executive branch action on human rights). 
26 See Stephen B. Cohen, Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices, 76 
AM. J. INT’L L. 246, 249–50 (1982) (arguing that when Congress’s initial attempt at 
conditioning U.S. assistance on human rights in Public Law 93–189, § 32 was ignored by 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Congress passed § 502B and subsequent amendments to 
tighten the law and ensure it would be enforced by the State Department).  Section 502B is 
codified as 22 U.S.C. § 2304.  22 U.S.C. § 2304 (2012).  The current version of the statute is 
considerably more comprehensive than the original, having been amended twenty-one times 
between 1974 and 2015.  Id.  In the literature, § 2304 is commonly referred to as § 502B, its 
location in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.  See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 26, at 247 (referring 
to § 2304 as 502B in the text of the article and citing to 22 U.S.C. § 2304).  This Note refers to 
it as § 2304, its location in the U.S. Code, for clarity and consistency. 
27 See § 2304(a)(2) (requiring a suspension of U.S. security assistance to any country that 
“engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human 
rights”).  The relevant portion of the statute states: 
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Section 2304(a)(2) prohibits security assistance to “any country the 
government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations 
of internationally recognized human rights.”28  The statute defines the 
                                                
Except under circumstances specified in this section, no security 
assistance may be provided to any country the government of which 
engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally 
recognized human rights.  Security assistance may not be provided to 
the police, domestic intelligence, or similar law enforcement forces of a 
country, and licenses may not be issued under the Export 
Administration Act of 1979 for the export of crime control and detection 
instruments and equipment to a country, the government of which 
engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally 
recognized human rights unless the President certifies in writing to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the chairman of the 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate (when 
licenses are to be issued pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 
1979).  [T]hat extraordinary circumstances exist warranting provision of 
such assistance and issuance of such licenses. Assistance may not be 
provided under part V of this subchapter to a country the government 
of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of 
internationally recognized human rights unless the President certifies in 
writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman 
of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that extraordinary 
circumstances exist warranting provision of such assistance. 
Id. 
 Perhaps the most significant contribution of § 2304 to human rights has been the 
reporting requirement contained in § 2304(b).  See Harold Hongju Koh, Restoring America’s 
Human Rights Reputation, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 635, 639 (2007) (describing the importance of 
the human rights reports required by § 2304).  Harold Hongju Koh, a noted human rights 
scholar at Yale Law School, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State during the Obama 
Administration, and Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 
during the Clinton Administration, argued that the reports produced pursuant to § 2304 
“have formed the heart of American human rights policy.”  Id.  Section 2304(b) requires that 
the Secretary of State provide Congress with an annual report on the human rights practices 
of any country proposed as a recipient of U.S. security assistance.  § 2304(b).  In practice, the 
State Department submits a report, commonly referred to as Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices, for virtually every country in the world.  See On-The-Record-Briefing on the 
2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices:  Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Tom Malinowski, ST. DEP’T (June 25, 2015), 
http://www.humanrights.gov/dyn/2015/06/on-the-record-briefing-on-the-2014-country-
reports-on-human-rights-practices/ [https://perma.cc/87X4-SXJF] (explaining that the 
2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, released in 2015, covered 199 countries 
and entities).  Predictably, the Country Reports have not escaped political influence and at 
times have applied different standards for assessing the human rights practices of allies and 
foes.  See David Sloss, Hard-Nosed Idealism and U.S. Human Rights Policy, 46 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 
431, 432 (2002) (arguing that “the country reports frequently contained half-truths about 
human rights abuses in friendly countries”). 
28 § 2304(a)(2).  The statute broadly defines “security assistance” to include military 
assistance, economic support funds, military education and training, peacekeeping funding, 
anti-terrorism assistance, sales of defense articles, and certain weapon sales.  § 2304(d)(2). 
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phrase “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” to 
include torture, arbitrary detention, disappearance, and other violations 
of the right to life, liberty, and security.29  Section 2304’s mechanism for 
conditioning U.S. security assistance on respect for human rights was an 
innovative effort by Congress to legislate a key role for human rights in 
foreign policy.30  However, the Nixon and Ford administrations “openly 
disregarded” the statute.31  Congress was surprised that during the Carter 
Administration, which proclaimed the value of human rights and 
provided the only examples of security assistance withheld under § 2304, 
the State Department flouted § 2304.32  Nonetheless, the Carter 
                                                
29 § 2304(d)(1).  While no uniform definition of a gross violation exists in international law, 
§ 2304’s definition would appear to reflect the United Nations’s view of what constitutes a 
gross violation.  See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (2012) (offering a list 
of abuses covered by the phrase gross violation of human rights).  According to the United 
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the acts generally understood 
as gross violations of human rights include:  “genocide, slavery and slavery-like practices, 
summary or arbitrary executions, torture, enforced disappearances, arbitrary and prolonged 
detention, and systematic discrimination.”  Id. 
30 See Cohen, supra note 26, at 247 (explaining that § 2304 was the principal legislative 
effort on human rights and security assistance); Weissbrodt, supra note 17, at 238 
(highlighting Congress’s view that enacting § 2304 was an opportunity to “make human 
rights a focus for a larger congressional role in U.S. foreign policy-making”). 
31 Cohen, supra note 26, at 249.  The executive branch’s contempt for Congress’s efforts led 
to congressional efforts to make § 2304 binding on the executive branch.  Id. at 253.  President 
Gerald Ford vetoed the legislation, explaining that it raised constitutional problems because 
it would “seriously inhibit [his] ability to implement a coherent and consistent foreign 
policy.”  SANDY VOGELGESANG, AMERICAN DREAM, GLOBAL NIGHTMARE:  THE DILEMMA OF 
U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY 131 (1980).  There is some evidence that Congress’s resolute 
determination that President Ford’s State Department incorporate human rights more 
centrally into its policy goals had an impact, albeit far from the impact sought by enacting 
§ 2304.  Id. at 131–32.  While Congress did block some security assistance it viewed as 
inconsistent with § 2304, Kissinger’s most significant concession to human rights advocates 
in Congress was addressing human rights concerns more regularly in his speeches.  Id. at 
133. 
32 Cohen, supra note 26, at 264–65 (describing the Carter Administration’s approach to 
implementation of § 2304).  In his inaugural address, President Jimmy Carter announced the 
important place human rights would have in his administration:  “Our moral sense dictates 
a clear-cut preference for those societies which share with us an abiding respect for 
individual human rights.”  Jimmy Carter, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1977).  While in office, 
President Carter declared that “human rights is the soul of our foreign policy.”  Cohen, supra 
note 26, at 264.  The Carter Administration did cut security assistance to some countries it 
deemed abusive.  VOGELGESANG, supra note 31, at 137.  See also Cohen, supra note 26, at 264 
(observing that the Carter Administration found “relatively few” governments met § 2304’s 
standard of engaging in a consistent pattern of gross human rights violations, and even less 
were subject to a suspension of assistance).  Shortly after taking office, the Carter 
Administration invoked § 2304 to cut all security assistance to Ethiopia and Uruguay, while 
reducing assistance to Argentina by fifty percent.  Cohen, supra note 26, at 272.  A few other 
infamous Latin American regimes saw their security assistance evaporate by 1979.  Id. at 272–
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Administration’s efforts remain the high water mark of § 2304’s 
effectiveness.33  Since Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, the U.S. 
government has not enforced § 2304’s security assistance restrictions.34 
By the late 1990s, human rights advocates were growing increasingly 
frustrated with § 2304’s failure to bar security assistance to abusive foreign 
forces, leading advocates in Congress and the human rights community 
to consider alternatives.35  The executive branch justified its disregard for 
§ 2304’s security assistance restriction mechanism by asserting it was 
untenable to punish an entire country’s security forces for the abuses of “a 
few bad apples.”36  Based on their experience with § 2304 and this critique, 
Senator Patrick Leahy’s staff began developing an enforceable alternative 
to § 2304’s assistance restriction mechanism.37 
                                                
73.  Yet overall, the Carter Administration’s determinations under § 2304 exhibited 
“tentativeness and caution.”  Id. at 264.  This tentative approach frustrated human rights 
advocates in Congress and spurred congressional action.  Id. at 254.  In 1978, Congress 
amended § 2304 in an effort to make it legally binding on the executive branch.  Pub. L. No. 
95-384, §§ 6(a)–(d)(1), (e), 92 Stat. 730 (1978).  In the bill’s conference committee report, the 
committee indicated that the amendment changed the language in the bill to “substitute for 
the current policy statement a legal requirement to deny security assistance” to abusive 
governments.  H.R. REP. NO. 95-1546, at 26 (1978) (Conf. Rep.).  See also Cohen, supra note 26, 
at 254 (recognizing Congress’s efforts to make § 2304 binding on the executive branch, rather 
than discretionary). 
33 See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT:  
LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 821 (1996) (positing that the executive branch has virtually never 
invoked § 2304 to cut off security assistance); Cohen, supra note 26, at 264 (explaining that, 
while the Carter Administration invoked § 2304 to cut off security assistance infrequently, it 
was applied in some cases). 
34 See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 33, at 821 (commenting that there have been “virtually 
no cases in which military assistance or foreign aid was in fact cut off on human rights 
grounds”); NINA M. SERAFINO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43361, “LEAHY LAW” HUMAN 
RIGHTS PROVISIONS AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE:  ISSUE OVERVIEW 3 (2014) (stating that § 2304 
“has been rarely if ever invoked” to suspend aid); Tate, supra note 19, at 340 (suggesting that 
§ 2304 was never enforced); Elizabeth Powers, Note, Greed, Guns and Grist:  U.S. Military 
Assistance and Arms Transfers to Developing Countries, 84 N.D. L. REV. 383, 409 (2008) (noting 
that § 2304 has rarely been employed to withhold military assistance on the basis of human 
rights).  The Department of Defense argued against enforcement of § 2304’s restriction on 
security assistance to abusive security forces, explaining that it is erroneous to punish a 
country’s entire security apparatus due to the abuses of only some members of that force.  
Tate, supra note 19, at 340. 
35 Tate, supra note 19, at 340 (highlighting the role played by human rights advocates from 
Amnesty International and Senator Leahy’s staff in discussing alternatives to § 2304). 
36 Id. 
37 See id. (relating the thought process of staff from Amnesty International and Senator 
Leahy’s office as they set about developing a workable alternative to § 2304’s failed 
restriction on security assistance); Ham, supra note 19 (quoting Senator Leahy as stating that 
the failure to invoke § 2304 led to his sponsorship of Leahy).  Leahy is not the only alternative 
to § 2304’s security assistance restriction mechanism.  See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 26, at 254 
(describing other legislative mechanisms for restricting U.S. security assistance based on 
human rights concerns, such as country-specific conditions).  Since 1974, Congress has 
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B. Leahy:  A Feasible Replacement for § 2304 
In 1997, Senator Patrick Leahy quietly added an amendment to the 
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act that developed a new mechanism 
                                                
passed country-specific legislation limiting security assistance to particular countries.  Id.  
While such limitations on assistance were prevalent in the 1970s and 1980s, a new generation 
of country-specific legislation began in 2000 when Congress proposed a $1.3 billion security 
assistance package to Colombia.  See ROBIN KIRK, MORE TERRIBLE THAN DEATH:  VIOLENCE, 
DRUGS, AND AMERICA’S WAR IN COLOMBIA 261 (2003) (recounting human rights conditions 
added to legislation appropriating security assistance for the Colombian security forces); 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE “SIXTH DIVISION:”  MILITARY-PARAMILITARY TIES AND U.S. 
POLICY IN COLOMBIA 91 (2001) (explaining that concerned members of Congress added 
human rights conditions on security assistance to Colombia, including the requirement that 
the Colombian Military sever ties with brutal right-wing paramilitary groups).  Country-
specific human rights conditions on security assistance reinforce but, more importantly, 
supplement Leahy.  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra, at 91 (indicating that country-specific 
conditions were needed for Colombia despite Leahy’s application to the security assistance).  
Leahy provisions must, by their nature, be generally applicable and, therefore, cannot be 
crafted to deal with the unique human rights challenges faced in any particular country.  See, 
e.g., SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 34, at 3 (clarifying that Leahy applies broadly to all assistance 
appropriated under the authorization of the Foreign Assistance Act).  The value of country-
specific human rights conditions is that Congress can design them to most effectively address 
the unique and specific human rights challenges faced in that country.  Compare Pub. L. No. 
109-102, § 556(a), 119 Stat. 2172 (2005) (conditioning twenty-five percent of security 
assistance to Colombia on specific human rights goals, such as Colombian military 
cooperation with civilian prosecutors and severing links with paramilitary death squads), 
with 22 U.S.C. § 2378d(a) (2012) (creating broad standards applicable to every country in the 
world under consideration for U.S. security assistance).  The application of country-specific 
conditions on security assistance to Colombia and Leahy illustrates the way these two 
mechanisms complement each other. See SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 34, at 3 n.6 
(acknowledging that both Leahy and country-specific conditions apply to Colombia).  Leahy 
generally withheld assistance from abusive units of the Colombian security forces and led to 
the prosecution of human rights violators.  See id. at 15 (examining Colombia as a case study 
on Leahy performance and noting that security assistance was suspended to some units 
accused of human rights abuses and Leahy spurred accountability for abuses in some cases).  
However, Leahy struggled to deal with the major human rights challenge of collusion 
between the Colombian security forces and the brutal right-wing paramilitary groups 
because such collusion did not amount to a gross violation of human rights.  See The Ties That 
Bind:  Colombia and Military-Paramilitary Links, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 1, 2000), 
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2000/colombia/ [https://perma.cc/V8B5-WKNU] 
(calling on Congress to expand Leahy to cover aiding and abetting a paramilitary group).  
Therefore, country-specific conditions were incorporated into the legislation authorizing 
security assistance to Colombia that required a portion of the security assistance be withheld 
until the Secretary of State certified, among other things, that the Colombian Government 
was investigating and prosecuting members of the Colombia security forces that had “aided 
or abetted paramilitary organizations.”  See Pub. L. No. 109-102, § 556(a)(2)(A), 119 Stat. 2172 
(2005) (withholding twenty-five percent of Foreign Operations Appropriations security 
assistance to Colombia until the State Department certified that Colombia met specific 
human rights benchmarks). 
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for withholding assistance to abusive foreign security forces.38  The 
amendment was modest, initially applying only to security assistance 
funds channeled through the State Department that fiscal year.39  The 
following year Congress extended Leahy’s provisions to funds for 
military training appropriated through the Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act.40  Finally, Congress codified the Foreign Operations 
Appropriations version of Leahy in 2008.41  The Defense Department 
Appropriations version has not been codified and must be annually 
incorporated into the Defense Appropriations legislation.42  However, 
both versions of Leahy are substantially similar.43  Given the similarities 
                                                
38 See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-118, § 570, 111 Stat. 2386 (1997) (enacting the original Leahy provision 
as part of the Foreign Operations Appropriations legislation); SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 34, 
at 3 (describing the genesis of Leahy); Tate, supra note 19, at 340 (depicting how Leahy was 
envisioned by Senator Leahy’s staff and Amnesty International staff).  The initial version of 
Leahy was passed a year prior, but was narrowly focused on counter-narcotics funds 
channeled through the State Department.  Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996); 
SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 34, at 3 (recognizing the original focus on only counter-narcotics 
assistance). 
39 See Pub. L. No. 105-118, § 507, 111 Stat. 2386 (1997) (applying only to funds subject to 
the Foreign Operations Appropriations legislation); see also SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 34, at 
3 (clarifying that Leahy was originally limited to funds appropriated through the Foreign 
Operations Appropriations legislation). 
40 See Pub. L. No. 105-262, § 8130, 112 Stat. 2279 (1998) (containing a Leahy provision 
applicable to a narrow category of Defense Department funding); see also SERAFINO ET AL., 
supra note 34, at 3 (recognizing the extension of Leahy to cover some Defense Department 
appropriations). 
41 See 22 U.S.C. § 2378d(a) (2012) (codifying the version of Leahy that was incorporated 
into the Foreign Operations Appropriations legislation).  Leahy was amended in 2011 and 
2014 to redefine some terms, clarify Congress’s vetting requirements, and add a reporting 
mechanism.  Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 7034(k), 125 Stat. 1216 (2011); Pub. L. No. 113-76, § 7034(l), 
128 Stat. 515 (2014).  See also SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 34, at 1 (noting that Leahy was 
codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2378d).  Before the 2011 amendment, when the assistance under 
consideration was training, the State Department would vet only the individual to be trained, 
rather than the “smallest operational group in the field,” as the State Department’s guidance 
required.  See id. at 8 (recounting the State Department’s individual-level scrutiny for training 
assistance before the 2011 amendment); DEPARTMENT OF STATE, LEAHY VETTING:  LAW, 
POLICY, PROCESS 8 (2013) (outlining the State Department’s guidance on interpreting the term 
“unit” for Leahy purposes). 
42 See SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 34, at 1 (underscoring that the Defense Appropriations 
version of Leahy is not codified and, therefore, must be incorporated into the Defense 
Appropriations legislation annually). 
43 Compare § 2378d(a) (withholding security assistance appropriated pursuant to the 
Foreign Assistance Act when there is credible information that the recipient unit is 
responsible for a gross violation of human rights), with Pub. L. No. 113-76, § 8057, 128 Stat. 5 
(2014) (prohibiting the transfer of security assistance appropriated pursuant to the National 
Defense Authorization Act when there is credible information that the recipient unit is 
responsible for a gross violation of human rights).  Before a 2014 change to the Defense 
Appropriations version of the law, there was a significant difference in the laws.  See 
Hunter-Bowman: To The People: Enhancing Leahy Law Human Rights Enforcement Throu
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2017
842 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51 
in the versions of the law and the scope of this undertaking, this Note 
focuses on the Foreign Assistance Act version of Leahy.44 
                                                
SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 34, at 4 (explaining that the 2014 change to the Defense 
Appropriations version of Leahy brought it more in line with the scope of the Foreign 
Assistance Act version of the law).  Previously, the Defense Appropriations version of the 
law only applied to military training, not the provision of equipment, military sales, or joint 
operations, among other things.  See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 112-10, § 8058, 125 Stat. 38 (2011) 
(restricting the Defense Department funds authorized by the Act “used to support any 
training program involving a unit of the security forces or police of a foreign country if the 
Secretary of Defense has received credible information from the Department of State that the 
unit has committed a gross violation of human rights”) (emphasis added).  The 2014 version 
of the law expands the law’s reach to theoretically include all Department of Defense 
funding.  See Pub. L. No. 113-76, § 8057, 128 Stat. 5 (2014) (stating that “[n]one of the funds 
made available by this Act may be used for any training, equipment, or other assistance for the 
members of a unit of a foreign security force if the Secretary of Defense has credible 
information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights”) (emphasis 
added).  Today, there are only three differences in the two mechanisms, two of which are 
insignificant.  See Human Rights Vetting:  Nigeria and Beyond:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Afr., Glob. Health, Glob. Human Rights, and Int’l Orgs. of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 113th 
Cong. 31 (2014)  [hereinafter Human Rights Vetting Hearing] (statement of Lauren Ploch 
Blanchard, Specialist in African Affairs, Congressional Research Service) (highlighting 
differences in the current versions of the Foreign Assistance Act and Defense Appropriations 
versions of the law); SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 34, at 5–6 (comparing the current versions 
of the Foreign Assistance Act version of the law and the Defense Appropriations version of 
the law).  The only significant difference is that the Defense Appropriations version includes 
a waiver mechanism if the Secretary of Defense determines that extraordinary circumstances 
merit waiving Leahy requirements.  See Pub. L. No. 113-76, § 8057(c), 128 Stat. 5 (2014) 
(providing a waiver mechanism “if the Secretary of Defense determines that [it] is required 
by extraordinary circumstances”).  However, the Secretary of Defense has yet to employ the 
waiver provision.  See Human Rights Vetting Hearing, supra note 43, at 12 (statement of Lauren 
Ploch Blanchard, Specialist in African Affairs, Congressional Research Service) (arguing that 
the Defense Department’s failure to issue a waiver under Leahy suggests a very high bar for 
use). 
44 See 22 U.S.C. §§ 2378d(a)–(d) (conditioning Foreign Operations Appropriations security 
assistance based on human rights criteria).  The current version of Leahy reads: 
(a) In general 
No assistance shall be furnished under this chapter or the Arms Export 
Control Act to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the 
Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has committed 
a gross violation of human rights. 
(b) Exception 
The prohibition in subsection (a) of this section shall not apply if the 
Secretary determines and reports to the Committee on Foreign Relations 
of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives, and the Committees on Appropriations that the 
government of such country is taking effective steps to bring the 
responsible members of the security forces unit to justice. 
(c) Duty to inform 
In the event that funds are withheld from any unit pursuant to this 
section, the Secretary of State shall promptly inform the foreign 
government of the basis for such action and shall, to the maximum 
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Subsection (a) of Leahy outlines the essence of the law:  “No assistance 
shall be furnished to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if 
the Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has 
committed a gross violation of human rights.”45  As a human rights 
mechanism, subsection (a) is similar to § 2304’s restriction mechanism.46  
However, Leahy restricts security assistance to “any unit of the security 
forces of a foreign country” that is allegedly responsible for a gross human 
                                                
extent practicable, assist the foreign government in taking effective 
measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces to 
justice. 
(d) Credible information 
The Secretary shall establish, and periodically update, procedures to— 
(1) ensure that for each country the Department of State has a current 
list of all security force units receiving United States training, 
equipment, or other types of assistance; 
(2) facilitate receipt by the Department of State and United States 
embassies of information from individuals and organizations outside 
the United States Government about gross violations of human rights 
by security force units; 
(3) routinely request and obtain such information from the Department 
of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other United States 
Government sources; 
(4) ensure that such information is evaluated and preserved; 
(5) ensure that when an individual is designated to receive United States 
training, equipment, or other types of assistance the individual's unit is 
vetted as well as the individual; 
(6) seek to identify the unit involved when credible information of a 
gross violation exists but the identity of the unit is lacking; and 
(7) make publicly available, to the maximum extent practicable, the 
identity of those units for which no assistance shall be furnished 
pursuant to subsection (a). 
Id. 
45 § 2378d(a). 
46 Compare § 2304(a)(2) (withholding security assistance to any country if that country’s 
government “engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized 
human rights”), with § 2378d(a) (restricting security assistance appropriated pursuant to the 
Foreign Assistance Act “if the Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has 
committed a gross violation of human rights”).  Section 2304(a)(2) states that “[e]xcept under 
circumstances specified in this section, no security assistance may be provided to any 
country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of 
internationally recognized human rights.”  § 2304(a)(2).  Section 2378d(a) states that “[n]o 
assistance shall be furnished under this chapter or the Arms Export Control Act to any unit 
of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible information 
that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.”  § 2378d(a).  See Human 
Rights Vetting Hearing, supra note 43, at 31 (statement of Stephen Rickard, Executive Director, 
Open Society Policy Center) (comparing § 2304 and Leahy); Tate, supra note 19, at 340 
(explaining that Leahy used § 2304’s approach, albeit with significant improvements, such 
as unit-level rather than country-level scrutiny). 
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rights violation.47  This was a significant departure from § 2304’s 
requirement that “no security assistance may be provided to any country” 
engaged in a pattern of gross violations of human rights.48  Leahy’s 
authors recognized that § 2304’s restriction mechanism was failing 
because it painted a country’s entire security force with the same brush.49  
Senator Leahy and his staff believed a narrower scope of scrutiny would 
allow this new measure to be more effective because it dealt with the 
major criticism of § 2304:  that a few bad apples could trigger a suspension 
of security assistance to an entire country’s security forces.50 
Leahy’s unit-level scrutiny is a significant, but logical, outgrowth of 
§ 2304’s failures; Leahy’s most revolutionary feature, and what made it 
stand apart from § 2304, is the statute’s anti-impunity mechanism.51  
                                                
47 § 2378d(a) (emphasis added).  The State Department construes the meaning of a unit of 
a foreign security force as “the lowest organizational element of a security force capable of 
exercising command and discipline over its members.”  SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 34, at 8.  
The State Department understood this as the appropriate definition based on Leahy’s 
legislative history.  DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 41, at 8.  State Department guidance 
suggests that a unit will most often be a battalion or its equivalent.  Id.  However, the State 
Department cautions that the meaning of the term unit “may be unique to the country, 
security force, and unit type.”  Id.  In some instances, such as in the case of an army, an entity 
as large as a brigade or as small as a company will be considered a unit for Leahy Law 
purposes.  See SECURITY ASSISTANCE MONITOR, APPLYING THE LEAHY LAW TO U.S. MILITARY 
AND POLICE AID 7 (2014) (describing the variations in the interpretations of a unit for 
purposes of Leahy). 
48 § 2304 (emphasis added).  See Tate, supra note 19, at 340 (highlighting the significance 
of the shift from § 2304’s country-level scrutiny to Leahy’s unit-level scrutiny). 
49 See SECURITY ASSISTANCE MONITOR, supra note 47, at 3 (clarifying that Congress’s 
decision to use unit-level scrutiny for Leahy was due to the executive branch’s reluctance to 
apply § 2304’s restriction mechanism because it required withholding “all security aid to a 
country’s entire armed forces”); Tate, supra note 19, at 340 (explaining the rationale behind 
the unit-level scrutiny of Leahy). 
50 See Tate, supra note 19, at 340 (explaining that Leahy was designed to address the 
principal criticism of § 2304); Human Rights Vetting Hearing, supra note 43, at 31 (statement of 
Stephen Rickard, Executive Director, Open Society Policy Center) (recognizing Leahy’s unit-
level scrutiny as an intermediate step between § 2304’s complete restriction on security 
assistance to an entire armed forces and no assistance restrictions).  Critics complained that 
§ 2304 created pariah countries that could never be cleared for security assistance after being 
barred by aid under § 2304.  Human Rights Vetting Hearing, supra, at 31 (statement of Stephen 
Rickard, Executive Director, Open Society Policy Center) (comparing the impact of an 
adverse determination under Leahy and § 2304).  However, under Leahy, U.S. security 
assistance can be resumed immediately upon the State Department determining that “the 
government of such country is taking effective steps to bring the responsible members of the 
security forces unit to justice.”  § 2378d(b). 
51 See Human Rights Vetting Hearing, supra note 43, at 42 (statement of Elisa Massimino, 
President and Chief Executive Officer, Human Rights First) (asserting that Leahy “set the 
standard” for human rights mechanisms by linking security assistance to accountability 
within security forces); SECURITY ASSISTANCE MONITOR, supra note 47, at 2 (calling Leahy “a 
powerful tool to curb impunity among military and police that receive U.S. assistance”). 
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Subsection (b) provides a path to remove the restriction on security 
assistance imposed by subsection (a).52  Under 22 U.S.C. § 2378d(b), 
subsection (a)’s requirement that security assistance be withheld if 
credible information indicates that the unit is responsible for a gross 
human rights violation is exempted if the State Department determines 
that the country “is taking effective steps to bring the responsible 
members of the security forces unit to justice.”53 
Impunity, the failure to punish perpetrators for their crimes, is a 
significant human rights problem.54  Impunity erodes the rule of law, 
leaving victims without any appropriate relief and diminishing the 
deterrent force of accountability.55  Subsection (b)’s coercive use of U.S. 
security assistance to promote accountability for human rights abuses is 
unique.56  Subsection (b) augments the statute’s human rights impact, 
while also making it less susceptible to the criticisms that rendered § 2304 
unenforceable.57  As such, subsection (b) provides a significant incentive 
to a country to bring perpetrators of human rights abuses to justice, at least 
                                                
52 See  § 2378d (restricting security assistance based on human rights criteria but providing 
an exception).  Leahy describes this mechanism as an “exception,” but, in reality, it is a 
condition a unit responsible for a gross violation of human rights must meet before the 
United States can lawfully provide security assistance.  See § 2378d(b) (providing an 
exception that allows for security assistance to a unit of a foreign security force despite 
credible information of a gross human rights abuse if the “country is taking effective steps 
to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice”). 
53 § 2378d(b).  Senator Leahy indicated that subsection (b) target’s one of Leahy’s primary 
goals:  ending impunity.  See 160 CONG. REC. S4452 (daily ed. July 14, 2014) (Statement of 
Sen. Leahy) (highlighting Leahy’s two primary goals).  Senator Leahy recounted that one of 
Leahy’s two goals is to “encourage foreign governments to bring to justice the individual 
members of units responsible for [gross violations of human rights].”  Id.  Senator Leahy 
noted that this added coercive mechanism was necessary because “[i]n many countries that 
receive U.S. aid[,] there is a long history of impunity for crimes committed by government 
security forces.”  Id. 
54 See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, OHCHR 
REPORT 2011 44 (2012) (stating that “impunity is often the primary obstacle to upholding the 
rule of law” because “[h]uman rights become a mockery when killings, disappearances, 
torture, rape[,] and other forms of sexual violence go unpunished”). 
55 See id. (detailing the impact of impunity on the rule of law and the victims of human 
rights abuses). 
56 See Human Rights Vetting Hearing, supra note 43, at 42 (statement of Elisa Massimino, 
President and Chief Executive Officer, Human Rights First) (recognizing the unique role of 
Leahy to spur accountability for human rights abuses within security forces). 
57 See, e.g., id. at 31 (statement of Stephen Rickard, Executive Director, Open Society Policy 
Center) (acknowledging that Leahy was an “intermediate step” and solved some of the 
problems that rendered § 2304 unenforceable); Tate, supra note 19, at 340 (commenting on 
the genesis of Leahy, which responded to the criticisms of § 2304 and developing a more 
workable alternative). 
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in the units of its security forces under consideration for U.S. assistance.58  
Simply transferring the offending party out of a unit does not constitute 
an “effective step.”59  To meet the Leahy standard, the foreign government 
must “carry out a credible investigation and . . . the individuals involved 
[must] face appropriate disciplinary action or impartial prosecution in 
accordance with local law.”60  Subsection (b)’s exception addresses one of 
the criticisms that rendered § 2304 unenforceable:  it created pariah 
security forces that would effectively be subject to a permanent ban on 
security assistance.61  Leahy, in contrast and by design, provides for the 
prompt resumption of security assistance to any foreign security force’s 
unit provided the government disciplines or prosecutes troops alleged to 
have committed a gross violation of human rights.62 
                                                
58 See § 2378d(b) (providing an exception to the restriction on security assistance if the 
foreign country takes “effective steps” to discipline or prosecute the perpetrator of a gross 
violation of human rights); Human Rights Vetting Hearing, supra note 43, at 30–31 (statement 
of Stephen Rickard, Executive Director, Open Society Policy Center) (describing the 
mechanism by which a foreign country facing a restriction on security assistance pursuant 
to Leahy can remedy the problem to allow for the resumption of aid, thus eliminating the 
§ 2304 problem of creating pariah countries unable to ever access U.S. security assistance). 
59 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 13–866, ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE, 
MONITORING, AND TRAINING COULD IMPROVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEAHY LAWS 6 (2013) 
(outlining State Department guidance for implementing Leahy that “specifies that 
transferring the offending individual or individuals from a unit does not constitute effective 
steps to bring the offending individuals to justice, nor does the mere opening of a formal 
investigation”); see also HUM. RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 37, at 95 (arguing that the U.S. 
Ambassador to Colombia and the Colombian military’s plan to transfer two officers 
allegedly responsible for human rights abuses out of a unit would not satisfy Leahy’s 
“effective steps” requirement). 
60 H.R. REP. NO. 105-401, at 91 (1997) (Conf. Rep.).  See also H.R. REP. NO. 105-825, at 1168 
(1998) (Conf. Rep.) (clarifying that Congress intended that foreign governments carry out a 
reasonable investigation into allegations of human rights abuses and that individuals found 
responsible for abuses face proper disciplinary action or prosecution).  The State 
Department’s guidance on Leahy implementation mirrors this requirement.  See U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 59, at 6 (recognizing that the State Department guidance 
indicates that “‘effective steps’ means that the foreign government must carry out a credible 
investigation and take steps so that individuals who are credibly alleged to have committed 
gross violations of human rights face impartial prosecution or appropriate disciplinary 
action”). 
61 See Human Rights Vetting Hearing, supra note 43, at 30–31 (statement of Stephen Rickard, 
Executive Director, Open Society Policy Center) (describing how Leahy eliminated the § 2304 
problem of creating pariah countries unable to ever access U.S. security assistance); Tate, 
supra note 19, at 340 (detailing the Defense Department’s concern that prohibiting security 
assistance to an entire security force constituted “unfairly punishing an entire institution for 
the work of a few bad apples”). 
62 See § 2378d(b) (providing an exception to the prohibition on security assistance if 
“effective steps” are taken by the foreign government).  Subsection (b) of Leahy reads: 
The prohibition in subsection (a) of this section shall not apply if the 
Secretary determines and reports to the Committee on Foreign Relations 
of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
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Leahy’s combination of security assistance restrictions and 
accountability mechanisms has produced surprisingly significant human 
rights results.63  While the U.S. government rarely invoked § 2304 to 
restrict security assistance in four decades, in just one three-year period, 
Leahy barred U.S. security assistance to 2516 units of foreign militaries 
due to human rights concerns.64  In 2011 alone, Leahy denied U.S. security 
assistance to 1766 foreign troops accused of human rights violations in 
forty-six countries.65  Leahy successfully withheld military assistance to 
foreign security forces responsible for gross violations of human rights in 
Bangladesh, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Turkey, and Sri Lanka.66 
                                                
Representatives, and the Committees on Appropriations that the 
government of such country is taking effective steps to bring the 
responsible members of the security forces unit to justice. 
Id. 
63 See, e.g., Human Rights Vetting Hearing, supra note 43, at 25–26 (2014) (statement of 
Stephen Rickard, Executive Director, Open Society Policy Center) (explaining that while 
Leahy implementation withheld security assistance in only one percent of cases studied in 
the three years before 2014, one percent of cases covered 2516 units of foreign militaries 
barred from receiving U.S. security assistance based on human rights concerns). 
64 See Cohen, supra note 26, at 264 (noting that the Carter Administration found “relatively 
few” governments met § 2304’s standard for triggering a suspension of assistance and even 
less saw any security assistance suspended).  The Carter Administration invoked § 2304 to 
cut all security assistance to Ethiopia and Uruguay while substantially reducing assistance 
to Argentina.  Id. at 272.  Other countries in Latin America were subject to security assistance 
cuts in 1979.  Id. at 272–73.  In general, the Carter Administration’s implementation of § 2304 
exhibited “tentativeness and caution.”  Id. at 264.  See also VOGELGESANG, supra note 31, at 
140 (describing the Carter Administration’s approach to congressional human rights 
restrictions, such as § 2304).  In contrast, Leahy has already been invoked on numerous 
occasions by Republican and Democratic administrations.  See Human Rights Vetting Hearing, 
supra note 43, at 25–26 (statement of Stephen Rickard, Executive Director, Open Society 
Policy Center) (indicating that Leahy barred security assistance to 2516 units of foreign 
militaries based on human rights concerns in the three years preceding 2014); see also Lisa 
Haugaard, The Law That Helps the U.S. Stop Heinous Crimes by Foreign Militaries, SECURITY 
ASSISTANCE MONITOR (May 28, 2015), http://www.securityassistance.org/blog/law-helps-
us-stop-heinous-crimes-foreign-militaries [https://perma.cc/W58C-YQTB] (outlining 
Leahy’s “noteworthy successes” in which “governments bring perpetrators to justice to 
receive U.S. security assistance,” citing specific examples in Honduras and Guatemala). 
65 Eric Schmitt, Military Says Law Barring U.S. Aid to Rights Violators Hurts Training Mission, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/21/us/politics/military-
says-law-barring-us-aid-to-rights-violators-hurts-training-mission.html [https://perma.cc/ 
PHE6-U54E] (recounting that the 1766 troops denied security assistance pursuant to Leahy 
were from 46 countries and represented a small fraction of the 200,000 troops vetted). 
66 See, e.g., Winifred Tate, U.S. Human Rights Activism and Plan Colombia, 69 COLOMBIA 
INTERNACIONAL 50, 66 (2009) (revealing that Leahy enforcement led to the security assistance 
suspensions to Mexico, Turkey, and Sri Lanka); SECURITY ASSISTANCE MONITOR, supra note 
47, at 3 (highlighting Leahy’s impact by describing the security assistance suspensions to 
Colombia, Guatemala, and Honduras); Lora Lumpe, What the Leahy Law Means for Human 
Rights, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND. (Apr. 24, 2014), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/ 
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voices/what-leahy-law-means-human-rights [https://perma.cc/6RHM-HAGL] 
(suggesting that the State Department refuses to publicize the cases in which Leahy 
enforcement led to security assistance suspensions for diplomatic reasons and recognizing 
that Leahy enforcement led to aid suspensions in Colombia, Indonesia, Pakistan, and 
Bangladesh). 
 Indonesia provides an illustrative example of Leahy enforcement.  See Indonesia:  US 
Resumes Military Assistance to Abusive Force:  Obama Administration Lifts Ban Despite Military’s 
Lack of Reform, Accountability, HUM. RIGHTS WATCH (July 22, 2010), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/07/22/indonesia-us-resumes-military-assistance-
abusive-force [https://perma.cc/HMD6-5226] [hereinafter Obama Administration Lifts Ban] 
(outlining Leahy issues in Indonesia).  Leahy barred Indonesia’s Komando Pasukan Khusus 
(“Kopassus”) Special Forces, a notoriously brutal unit of the Indonesian Armed Forces, from 
receiving U.S. security assistance from 1999 to 2010.  See id. (explaining that a decade-long 
ban on U.S. security assistance to Kopassus under Leahy was lifted in 2010).  Credible 
information indicated that Kopassus was responsible for gross violations of human rights, 
including killings, disappearances, and torture.  See 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices Indonesia, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF ST., (Feb. 
23, 2000), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/288.htm [https://perma.cc/8ZHY-
46LH] (recognizing killings of civilians committed by Kopassus); Indonesia:  Kopassus 
Conviction Small Step Towards Ending Impunity, AMNESTY INT’L (Sept. 5, 2013), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2013/09/indonesia-kopassus-conviction-
small-step-towards-ending-impunity/ [https://perma.cc/HU4Y-YUCN] (documenting the 
convictions of eight Kopassus troops for the extrajudicial execution of detainees); Obama 
Administration Lifts Ban, supra note 66 (describing the human rights abuses allegedly 
committed by Kopassus).  According to Human Rights Watch, “[t]he [U.S.] government cut 
off all aid to the Indonesian military in 1999 as a result of widespread human rights violations 
in East Timor and has refused to resume aid to Kopassus in particular because of ongoing 
concerns about its record and lack of accountability.”  Obama Administration Lifts Ban, supra 
note 66.  The decision to resume security assistance to Kopassus in 2010 was controversial, 
but the Secretary of Defense suggested renewed assistance was warranted due to steps taken 
by the Indonesian government to bring human rights abusers to justice, as outlined in 
Leahy’s subsection (b).  See 22 U.S.C. § 2378d(b) (2012) (detailing Leahy’s “effective steps” 
exception for resuming security assistance); Obama Administration Lifts Ban, supra note 66 
(criticizing the decision to resume security assistance, arguing that the steps taken to address 
impunity for past human rights abuses was inadequate); David S. Cloud, U.S. to Resume Aid 
to Kopassus, Indonesia’s Controversial Military Forces, L.A. TIMES (July 23, 2010), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/23/world/la-fg-0723-indonesia-obama-20100723 
[https://perma.cc/3RZ4-BWY2] (reporting that the Indonesian government agreed to 
remove Kopassus troops convicted of human rights violations). 
 Significantly, Leahy enforcement has not been limited to countries outside the political 
and national security spotlight.  See, e.g., Adam Taylor, Why Nigeria’s President Thinks the U.S. 
has “Aided and Abetted” Boko Haram, WASH. POST (July 23, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/07/23/why-nigerias-
president-thinks-the-u-s-has-aided-and-abetted-boko-haram/ [https://perma.cc/9QGX-
HRPJ] (highlighting the controversy surrounding Leahy’s prohibition on security assistance 
to some units of the Nigerian security forces during their fight against Boko Haram).  Leahy’s 
prohibition on security assistance to a large percentage of the Nigerian security forces’ units 
fighting Boko Haram in the wake of that group’s kidnapping of 219 school girls created 
significant pressure on the Obama Administration, and the State Department in particular, 
to release the barred assistance.  See id. (quoting House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman 
Ed Royce stating that he and the Nigerian President discussed eliminating the “obstacle to 
greater U.S.-Nigeria cooperation” created by Leahy).  Nevertheless, the State Department 
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Leahy’s impact has not been limited to barring security assistance; the 
statute’s anti-impunity measure has coerced accountability for human 
rights abusers in Indonesia, Honduras, Guatemala, Colombia, and 
Bangladesh.67  In Honduras, for example, Juan Carlos “El Tigre” Bonilla 
ascended to lead the Honduran National Police despite credible 
allegations that he was responsible for gross human rights violations, 
                                                
maintained its prohibition on security assistance to fifty percent of Nigeria’s security forces.  
See Boko Haram:  The Growing Threat to Schoolgirls, Nigeria, and Beyond:  Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 113th Cong. 29 (2014) (statement of Rep. Edward R. Royce, 
Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs) (arguing that Leahy was barring active 
cooperation with the Nigerian military in its operations against Boko Haram); Human Rights 
Vetting Hearing, supra note 43, at 4 (statement of Rep. Christopher Smith, Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International 
Organizations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs) (explaining that, according to the 
Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, half of the 
Nigerian military is barred from receiving U.S. security assistance under Leahy); Human 
Rights Vetting Hearing, supra note 43, at 21 (statement of Colonel Peter Aubrey (Retired), 
President, Strategic Opportunities International) (complaining that despite Leahy’s “noble 
intent,” the statute includes a cumbersome and time-consuming vetting regime that renders 
emergency response efforts impossible and black lists foreign troops); Ali Weinberg, Nigerian 
Military Human Rights Abuses Won’t Stop American Search Assistance, Official Says, ABC NEWS 
(May 14, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/05/nigerian-military-human-
rights-abuses-wont-affect-american-search-assistance-official-says/ [https://perma.cc/ 
7UYP-VTPW] (reporting on the efforts to provide assistance to the Nigerian military while 
acknowledging that some units are barred from receiving security assistance pursuant to 
Leahy); Nigeria’s Buhari Presses for Military Aid, Pledges “Zero Tolerance” for Corruption, U.S. 
INST. OF PEACE (July 22, 2015), http://www.usip.org/publications/2015/07/22/nigerias-
buhari-presses-military-aid-pledges-zero-tolerance-corruption [https://perma.cc/KXS6-
P3PR] (quoting Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari, who claimed that Leahy’s “blanket 
application . . . on the grounds of unproven allegations of human rights violations leveled 
against our forces has denied us access to appropriate strategic weapons to prosecute the 
war against the insurgents”); but see UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GENERAL, INSPECTION OF EMBASSY ABUJA AND CONSULATE GENERAL LAGOS, 
NIGERIA 6 (2013) (indicating that in fiscal year 2012, only 211 troops out of 1377 vetted 
pursuant to Leahy, or only 15 percent of troops vetted, were prohibited from receiving 
security assistance). 
67 See, e.g., Human Rights Vetting Hearing, supra note 43, at 42–43 (statement of Elisa 
Massimino, President and Chief Executive Officer, Human Rights First) (noting that Leahy 
has spurred accountability for human rights violations in Colombia and Bangladesh); Obama 
Administration Lifts Ban, supra note 66 (recognizing the steps taken to address impunity for 
past human rights abuses in Indonesia before resumption of U.S. security assistance); 
Haugaard, supra note 64 (describing Leahy’s impact, noting that “governments bring 
perpetrators to justice in order to receive U.S. security assistance,” and citing specific 
examples in Honduras and Guatemala).  Surprisingly, the State Department reported to the 
Government Accountability Office’s investigators that “they are unaware of any case in 
which the Secretary of State has made the determination necessary to invoke the exception 
and provide assistance to an otherwise ineligible unit.”  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
supra note 59, at 6. 
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including participating in the Los Magníficos death squad.68  The 
Honduran government removed Mr. Bonilla from his position due to 
pressure from the United States to take effective steps against Mr. Bonilla 
or risk a suspension of security assistance.69 
However, Leahy has sometimes failed, with security assistance 
reaching units despite credible information about a gross human rights 
violation.70  Human rights groups and others have reported that Leahy 
failed to withhold security assistance to abusive units in Colombia, 
Afghanistan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Israel, and Honduras.71  Many 
consider Colombia the test case for Leahy, as the law was originally 
enacted in response to United States’ interest in significantly increasing 
                                                
68 See Mark Weisbrot, Opinion, Will Congress Act to Stop US Support for Honduras’ Death 
Squad Regime?, GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 
2013/mar/30/congress-us-support-honduras-death-squad-regime [https://perma.cc/ 
TG2V-SNNN] (alleging Juan Carlos Bonilla, Director General of the Honduran police, had 
been investigated for his connection to death squads); Oscar Martinez, The Macho Cops of 
Honduras, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/08/opinion/ 
hondurass-macho-cops.html [https://perma.cc/JLD2-CR6L] (suggesting that Mr. Bonilla 
was removed from his position as Director General of the Honduran police due to allegations 
that he participated in a death squad—Los Magníficos—that was responsible for 
extrajudicial executions). 
69 See Martinez, supra note 68 (reporting on the pressure on Honduras to discipline Mr. 
Bonilla); see also Haugaard, supra note 64 (underscoring Mr. Bonilla’s removal as the head of 
the Honduran police force as a Leahy success story). 
70 See, e.g., TATE, supra note 12, at 266 (explaining that, despite the State Department 
suspending U.S. security assistance to several Colombian battalions under Leahy, human 
rights groups maintained that Leahy was not being properly implemented); FELLOWSHIP OF 
RECONCILIATION & COLOMBIA-EUROPE-U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVATORY, THE RISE AND 
FALL OF “FALSE POSITIVE” KILLINGS IN COLOMBIA:  THE ROLE OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE, 
2000–2010 4 (2014) (concluding that the commission of 5763 extrajudicial executions was 
correlated to U.S. security assistance to the Colombia military); Tenorio Miller, supra note 12, 
at 685 (positing that Leahy was nearly a categorical failure in Colombia because human rights 
data suggests that U.S. security assistance continued despite human rights violations by the 
Colombian military). 
71 See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE ET AL., U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 
WITH RESPECT TO THE PROTECTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
DEFENDERS:  JOINT SUBMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 7 (2014) (contending that the United States has not fully 
implemented Leahy Law obligations with regard to security assistance to Israeli security 
forces); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 9, at 6 (citing cases in which security assistance 
was delivered to units of the Colombian security forces despite credible information 
regarding a gross violation of human rights); Tenorio Miller, supra note 12, at 694 
(highlighting Leahy Law failures in Colombia, Afghanistan, and the Philippines); Obama 
Administration Lifts Ban, supra note 66 (arguing that human rights concerns should have 
maintained a bar on U.S. security assistance to Indonesia’s Special Forces); Weisbrot, supra 
note 68 (alleging that U.S. security assistance to the Honduran police force violated Leahy 
due to the persistent allegations of human rights abuses tied to the Director General of the 
Honduran police, who controls the entire force). 
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assistance to Colombian security forces.72  Although Leahy has shown that 
it can be effective in Colombia, Leahy was unevenly enforced there, 
allowing security assistance to reach notoriously brutal units of the 
Colombian military.73  The high profile failures of Leahy have led some to 
explore whether judicial enforcement of Leahy could effectively secure the 
law’s human rights promise.74 
                                                
72 See SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 34, at 15 (noting that “preventing U.S. assistance from 
benefiting perpetrators of human rights violations in the Colombian security forces was a 
major impetus for the introduction of the Leahy provisions” and affirming its importance by 
analyzing the implementation of Leahy in Colombia); THE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL 
POLICY, GETTING IN DEEPER:  THE UNITED STATES’ GROWING INVOLVEMENT IN COLOMBIA’S 
CONFLICT 8 (2000) (“Colombia is a key test case for Leahy’s implementation.”); Tate, supra 
note 19, at 340 (describing Colombia’s role in the genesis of Leahy). 
73 See, e.g., TATE, supra note 12, at 266 (explaining the State Department suspended security 
assistance to several Colombian military units; however, human rights groups insisted that 
Leahy was “not being fully implemented”); KIRK, supra note 37, at 261 (recognizing that U.S. 
security assistance was provided to the Colombian military despite its involvement in gross 
human rights abuses through its operations with Colombian paramilitary death squads); 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 9, at 6–7 (citing cases demonstrating that security 
assistance was provided to Colombian security forces’ units despite credible information 
regarding a gross violation of human rights); FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION & COLOMBIA-
EUROPE-U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVATORY, supra note 70, at 4 (concluding that there was a 
correlation between the commission of 5763 extrajudicial executions and U.S. security 
assistance to the Colombia military);  FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION & U.S. OFFICE ON 
COLOMBIA, MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS:  COLOMBIA, U.S. ACCOUNTABILITY, 
AND GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS 35 (2010) (maintaining that Leahy’s implementation in Colombia 
indicates that the law is insufficient, in some cases, to prevent U.S. security assistance from 
reaching abusive troops); Tenorio Miller, supra note 12, at 685 (contending that Leahy 
approached a “categorical failure” in Colombia because U.S. security assistance continued 
notwithstanding the Colombian military’s abusive human rights record); Joshua Goodman, 
Human Rights Watch Says Colombian Generals Escaping Punishment for Role in Civilian Killings, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 24, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/ 
2015/06/24/report-colombia-generals-go-unpunished-in-civilian-killings 
[https://perma.cc/Y32B-N76W] (reporting that Human Rights Watch called for a partial 
suspension of U.S. security assistance to Colombia over the Colombian military’s role in 
civilian killings). 
74 See Abusharar v. Hagel, 77 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1006 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (considering a suit by 
a Palestinian-American seeking an injunction under Leahy against further military assistance 
to Israel due to human rights abuses); Tenorio Miller, supra note 12, at 692–94 (analyzing the 
availability of a judicial remedy for Leahy Law enforcement); see also infra Part III.C (arguing 
that judicial enforcement of Leahy is foreclosed by the political question and standing 
doctrines). 
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C. Judicial Enforcement of the Human Rights Restrictions on U.S. Security 
Assistance 
Judicial enforcement of human rights conditions on foreign military 
assistance has never been successful.75  For decades, claimants have 
sought judicial review in U.S. courts as a last resort for enforcement of 
human rights restrictions on security assistance to foreign security forces 
because they believed the executive branch was eschewing its duty to 
enforce human rights restrictions.76  However, courts have turned away 
all such cases on political question doctrine grounds or due to the 
plaintiff’s lack of standing.77 
The political question doctrine is the first hurdle for a claimant seeking 
to enforce a restriction on U.S. security assistance.78  The political question 
doctrine dates back to Marbury v. Madison; however, the modern test is 
derived from Baker v. Carr.79  The Supreme Court recently affirmed this 
                                                
75 See generally Tenorio Miller, supra note 12, at 692–94 (evaluating the feasibility of judicial 
review of Leahy enforcement); see also Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1356–57 (D.C. Cir. 
1983) (finding that the suit by twenty-nine members of Congress against the President and 
other government officials to enjoin military assistance to El Salvador, claiming the 
assistance violated § 2304, was barred by the political question doctrine and, according to 
Judge Robert Bork’s concurrence, a lack of standing); Abusharar, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1006–07 
(ruling that a Palestinian-American who sued in U.S. federal court under Leahy seeking an 
injunction against further military assistance to Israel lacked standing and the claim was 
barred by the political question doctrine); Clark v. United States, 609 F. Supp. 1249, 1251 (D. 
Md. 1985) (holding that plaintiff taxpayers lacked standing in their suit claiming that 
assistance to Nicaraguan rebels was barred by § 2304). 
76 See, e.g., Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1356 (resolving a suit brought under § 2304 by twenty-nine 
members of Congress against the President and other government officials to enjoin military 
assistance to El Salvador); Abusharar, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1007 (considering a motion to dismiss 
a claim brought by a Palestinian-American who sued in U.S. federal court under Leahy 
seeking an injunction against further military assistance to Israel); Clark, 609 F. Supp. at 1249 
(determining whether plaintiff taxpayers had standing to sue for reimbursement of their 
taxes used to supply security assistance to Nicaraguan rebels in violation of § 2304). 
77 See, e.g., Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1356–57 (barring the claimants’ suit to enjoin security 
assistance due to the political question doctrine and, according to Judge Bork’s concurrence, 
a lack of standing); Abusharar, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1006–07 (ordering the dismissal of a suit to 
enjoin military assistance to Israel due to lack of standing and the political question doctrine); 
Clark, 609 F. Supp. at 1251 (deciding that claimants lacked standing in their suit claiming 
security assistance to Nicaraguan rebels violated § 2304). 
78 See, e.g., Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1356–57 (concluding that the claimants’ suit to enjoin 
security assistance was barred by the political question doctrine); Abusharar, 77 F. Supp. 3d 
at 1006–07 (dismissing a suit to enjoin military assistance to Israel due to the political 
question doctrine).  A political question is defined as a “question that a court will not 
consider because it involves the exercise of discretionary power by the executive or 
legislative branch of government.”  BLACK’S Political Question, supra note 20. 
79 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 166 (1803) (holding that the President has 
“important political powers” that he is to exercise at this own discretion, and thus, “is 
accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience”); see also 
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long-standing doctrine, holding that a case “involves a political 
question . . . where there is a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.”80  
Courts have consistently held that decisions regarding the provision of 
security assistance are the purview of the executive branch, not the judicial 
branch.81 
The next obstacle for a claimant seeking to enforce a restriction on U.S. 
security assistance is establishing standing.82  A claimant cannot simply 
                                                
Derek Baxter, Protecting the Power of the Judiciary:  Why the Use of State Department “Statements 
of Interest” in Alien Tort Statute Litigation Runs Afoul of Separation of Powers Concerns, 37 
RUTGERS L.J. 807, 826 (2006) (defining the political question doctrine as “a mechanism by 
which a court declines to hear a case that deals with issues more properly belonging before 
one of the ‘political’ branches of government”); James R. May, Civil Litigation as a Tool for 
Regulating Climate Change:  An Introduction, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 357, 359 (2012) (describing the 
political question doctrine and holding “that federal courts should not consider certain 
matters consigned to the representative branches”). The modern test is derived from Baker v. 
Carr and focuses on the first three factors announced in Baker.  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
217 (1962); R. Andrew Smith, Breaking the Stalemate:  The Judiciary’s Constitutional Role in 
Disputes over the War Powers, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1517, 1527 (2007) (recognizing that the Baker 
Court refined the boundaries of the doctrine).  According to the Baker test, a case implicates 
a political question when it contains: 
[(1)] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to 
a coordinate political department; [(2)] or a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; [(3)] or the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a 
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; [(4)] or the impossibility of a 
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of 
the respect due coordinate branches of government; [(5)] or an unusual 
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; 
[(6)] or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question. 
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
80 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012) (internal quotations 
removed). 
81 See, e.g., Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529–30 (1988) (acknowledging that 
national security, foreign policy, and military affairs are the province and responsibility of 
the executive branch; therefore, the courts show the “utmost deference” to the executive 
branch in these areas); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 575 (2d Cir. 2009) (underscoring the 
Supreme Court’s caution to lower courts on intruding into national security and foreign 
affairs issues constitutionally delegated to the executive branch); Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1356–
57 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of claimants’ suit to enjoin security assistance on 
political question doctrine grounds); Abusharar, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1006 (dismissing a suit to 
enjoin military assistance to Israel due to the political question doctrine). 
82 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499–500 (1975) (requiring that a plaintiff assert 
her own legal rights, and not simply those of public interest that other branches of 
government are better positioned to resolve, to establish standing); United States v. 
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 170 (1974) (finding that a plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (“CIA”) financial reporting); Abusharar, 
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sue the government or its representatives to insist that they fully and fairly 
enforce a law.83  To establish standing, “a plaintiff must show (1) an injury 
in fact, (2) a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the 
conduct complained of, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be 
redressed by a favorable decision.”84  In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the 
Supreme Court held that to demonstrate standing for injunctive relief, 
“the threat to the plaintiffs [must be] sufficiently real and immediate to 
show an existing controversy.”85  Of particular importance for a plaintiff 
seeking to enjoin foreign military assistance, the Court held that “past 
exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or 
controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any 
continuing, present adverse effects.”86 
In the only case addressing judicial enforcement of Leahy, Abusharar 
v. Hagel, a Palestinian-American with a home and family in the Gaza Strip, 
sued in U.S. federal court for an injunction to enforce Leahy and bar 
                                                
77 F. Supp. 3d at 1007 (concluding that the plaintiff, a Palestinian-American lawyer bringing 
suit in federal court to enjoin further U.S. security assistance to the Israeli defense force, 
lacked standing to bring such a suit).  Standing is defined as “[a] party’s right to make a legal 
claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.”  BLACK’S Standing, supra note 20. 
83 See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997) (holding that a 
claimant will not satisfy the standing doctrine and establish a case or controversy simply by 
advocating an interest “in the proper application of the Constitution and laws”); Diamond 
v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65 (1986) (emphasizing that the “concerns for state autonomy” that 
bar standing for a claimant seeking to compel the government to enforce its laws “apply with 
even greater force” when a claimant attempts to compel individual enforcement decisions); 
see also 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3531.10 (3d ed. 2008) (reviewing Supreme Court jurisprudence on the standing 
doctrine and highlighting that there is no standing in federal court for a citizen or taxpayer 
seeking to enjoin the government to abide by the law). 
84 Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (internal quotation marks 
removed); accord Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2028 (2011) (recognizing the three 
conditions for establishing standing). 
85 461 U.S. 95, 103 (1983).  See also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 
(2013) (explaining the imminency requirement of the standing doctrine and clarifying that 
the “threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact, and that 
allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
86 City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983).  In Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, the 
Supreme Court indicated that the standing doctrine “serves to prevent the judicial process 
from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.”  133 S. Ct. at 1146.  Therefore, 
courts are likely to find a claimant lacks standing in cases in which the judicial branch is 
asked to “review actions of the political branches in the fields of [national security] and 
foreign affairs.”  Id. at 1147.  Thus, a Leahy plaintiff’s standing would face heightened 
scrutiny because significant national security and foreign affairs issues are implicated in 
vetting a foreign security force for the provision of U.S. security assistance.  160 CONG. REC. 
S4452 (daily ed. July 14, 2014) (Statement of Senator Leahy) (acknowledging that critics argue 
that Leahy clashes with national security interests because it creates obstacles to the 
provision of U.S. security assistance to foreign allies). 
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further military assistance to Israel.87  Abusharar claimed that his Gaza 
Strip home had recently been destroyed in a bombing by the Israeli 
military and his father had died as a result of the Israeli siege of Gaza.88  
However, the court held that Leahy provides no private cause of action to 
sue for enforcement of Leahy, and the suit was barred by both the political 
question doctrine and the plaintiff’s lack of standing.89  Without a private 
cause of action that could overcome these obstacles to judicial 
enforcement, taxpayers and victims of human rights abuses abroad must 
rely on the State Department and congressional oversight for Leahy 
enforcement.90 
Yet, Congress has created a private cause of action to overcome long-
standing barriers to a judicial remedy for human rights violations.91  
                                                
87 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1006.  A claimant like Abusharar may have felt compelled to seek 
judicial enforcement of Leahy because Leahy’s application to U.S. security assistance to Israel 
is complicated by the importance placed on military cooperation with the Israeli defense 
forces, despite allegations of human rights abuses.  See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2015/16:  THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS 201–02 (2016) 
(reporting human rights abuses committed by the Israeli security forces, including unlawful 
killings, extrajudicial executions, torture, and other ill-treatment of Palestinians); JIM 
ZANOTTI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33476, ISRAEL:  BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS 26–27 
(2015) (recognizing the belief that U.S. security assistance to Israel is a “pillar[] of a regional 
security order”); AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE ET AL., supra note 71, at 6 
(describing the Israeli military’s responsibility for “grave and continuous” human rights 
violations).  Members of Congress and human rights organizations have called for more 
robust enforcement of Leahy in relation to U.S. security assistance to Israel.  See, e.g., Letter 
from Representative Betty McCollum to Ambassador Anne Woods Patterson and Assistant 
Secretary of State Tom Malinowski (Aug. 18, 2015) [hereinafter Letter from Representative 
McCollum] (calling on the State Department to investigate whether Leahy should bar U.S. 
security assistance to a company of the Israeli Border Police due to the unit’s alleged role in 
extrajudicial executions); AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE ET AL., supra note 71, at 7 
(claiming that the United States has failed to properly enforce Leahy with regard to security 
assistance to Israeli security forces). 
88 Abusharar, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1006. 
89 Id. at 1006–07. 
90 See infra Part III.C (analyzing the obstacles to judicial enforcement of Leahy and the 
need for a private cause of action). 
91 See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) 
(enacting a private cause of action to sue individuals for damages resulting from torture or 
an extrajudicial killing).  The TVPA was codified as a note following the Alien Tort Statute 
(“ATS”).  28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2012).  The TVPA was intended to supplement the remedies 
available under the ATS.  See Brief for Arlen Specter et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10–1491) 
(clarifying, as the key proponent of the TVPA in the Senate, the relationship between the 
TVPA and the ATS). As the TVPA’s legislative history demonstrates, Congress took a 
favorable view of the Second Circuit’s application of the ATS in the seminal case Filartiga v. 
Pena-Irala, in which Paraguayan citizens sued another Paraguayan citizen under the ATS for 
wrongfully causing the death of their son by torture.  See H.R. Rep. No. 102-367 (1991) (noting 
that the Filartiga opinion was “met with general approval”); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 
876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980) (accepting that the ATS can be used as a basis for federal court 
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Congress passed the Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”) to “provide 
a Federal cause of action against any individual who, under actual or 
apparent authority, or under color of law, [sic] of any foreign nation, 
subjects any individual to torture or extrajudicial killing.”92  Courts have 
recognized justiciable claims under the TVPA to redress human rights 
concerns.93  However, the statute is limited in scope and does not reach 
                                                
jurisdiction over a tort claim); see also Rachael E. Schwartz, “And Tomorrow?” The Torture 
Victim Protection Act, 11 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 271, 283 (1994) (indicating that Congress 
looked favorably on the Filartiga opinion when considering the TVPA).  Congress was 
dismayed by Judge Bork’s concurring opinion in the fractured District of Columbia Circuit 
decision in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, which sought to significantly limit the 
jurisdictional grant of the ATS.  See H.R. Rep. No. 102-367 (1991) (acknowledging Judge 
Bork’s opinion); Schwartz, supra note 91, at 283–84.  See also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab 
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (arguing that the ATS does 
not provide jurisdiction for a federal court to hear a case involving torture committed in a 
foreign country); Michael C. Small, Note, Enforcing International Human Rights Law in Federal 
Courts:  The Alien Tort Statute and the Separation of Powers, 74 GEO. L.J. 163, 179 (1985) 
(contrasting the human rights impact of the Filartiga opinion and Bork’s opinion in Tel-Oren).  
Congress therefore explicitly stated that the TVPA was intended to create a private right of 
action to ensure U.S. courts would hear cases involving torture abroad.  See H.R. Rep. No. 
102-367 (1991) (asserting that the TVPA provides a private cause of action to allow federal 
courts to hear claims by victims of torture committed in foreign countries).  The House 
Report indicated that the TVPA was intended to extend, rather than restrict, the remedy 
provided by the ATS.  See id. (underscoring Congress’s view that the TVPA “would also 
enhance the remedy already available under § 1350 in an important respect:  While the Alien 
Tort Claims Act provides a remedy to aliens only, the TVPA would extend a civil remedy 
also to U.S. citizens who may have been tortured abroad”). 
92 H.R. Rep. No. 102-367 (1991).  See also Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (creating a 
private cause of action to sue individuals for damages resulting from torture or an 
extrajudicial killing); 137 Cong. Rec. H11244-04 (1991) (describing the purpose of the TVPA). 
Upon introducing the TVPA in the House, Congressman Romano Mazzoli said that the 
TVPA “clarifies existing law to make explicit that victims of torture can bring a Federal civil 
cause of action against their torturer.”  Id.  Two principal factors motivated Congress to pass 
the TVPA:  a fractured District of Columbia Circuit decision in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab 
Republic questioning the reach of the ATS and ratification of the United Nations Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.  See 
Schwartz, supra note 91, at 275 (analyzing the legislative history of the TVPA to determine 
the Act’s purpose and Congress’s motivations in passing it).  Congress viewed passing the 
TVPA as a necessary step in implementing the Convention Against Torture.  See H.R. Rep. 
No. 102-367 (1991) (clarifying that the Convention placed a special emphasis on enforcement 
mechanisms and obligated state parties to adopt accountability measures against alleged 
torturers). 
93 See, e.g., Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 383–84 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d and remanded, 560 
U.S. 305 (2010) (ruling that Somali citizens’ TVPA claim against a former high-ranking 
Somali government official for torture and extrajudicial killing was not barred by the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act and remanding to the district court for further action); Jean v. 
Dorelien, 431 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that Haitian citizens stated a TVPA claim 
against a former Haitian military officer for torture and extrajudicial killing); Ford ex rel. 
Estate of Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that survivors of 
victims stated a TVPA claim against former Director of Salvadoran National Guard and 
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Leahy enforcement.94  Nevertheless, congressional action to expand the 
TVPA to provide a private cause of action to enforce Leahy would avoid 
the doctrinal barriers to its judicial enforcement.95 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Despite Leahy’s surprising human rights achievements, foreign 
recipients of U.S. military assistance vetted under Leahy’s provisions 
continue to violate human rights.96  Similarly, human rights abusers are 
                                                
former Salvadoran Minister of Defense, although the court affirmed the jury’s verdict for the 
defendants); Warfaa v. Ali, 33 F. Supp. 3d 653 (E.D. Va. 2014) (denying a motion to dismiss 
a TVPA claim against a former Somali military officer brought by a Somali national who was 
allegedly tortured); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 198–99 (D. Mass. 1995) (awarding 
damages to Guatemalan citizens and a U.S. citizen in a default judgment on a TVPA claim 
against a former Guatemalan Minister of Defense). 
94 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2012) (limiting the scope of human rights abuses covered to 
torture and extrajudicial killings committed by individuals acting under the color of law).  
The TVPA reaches only what the statute defines as torture and extrajudicial killings 
perpetrated by individuals acting under the color of law.  Id.  While the statutory definitions 
of torture and extrajudicial killing are based on international human rights standards, they 
do not cover the full range of human rights abuses a plaintiff may have.  See Christopher A. 
Whytock et al., Foreword:  After Kiobel—International Human Rights Litigation in State Courts 
and under State Law, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1, 4 (2013) (acknowledging that the TVPA is not an 
adequate replacement for the ATS because it is limited to cases of torture and extrajudicial 
killings).  The Supreme Court further narrowed the TVPA’s reach by holding that only 
natural persons are individuals under the statute, thus shielding corporations and 
organizations from TVPA claims.  See Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1710 
(2012) (holding that the plain text and the legislative history of the TVPA indicate that 
Congress did not extend liability to corporations or other organizations); see also Roxanna 
Altholz, Chronicle of a Death Foretold:  The Future of U.S. Human Rights Litigation Post-Kiobel, 
102 CAL. L. REV. 1495, 1521 (2014) (explaining that Mohamad bars TVPA claims against 
corporations and organizations). 
95 See infra Part IV (proposing a private cause of action for Leahy enforcement). 
96 See supra Part II.B (reviewing the human rights achievements and failures of Leahy).  
Human rights advocates in Congress and in the non-governmental sector, who had watched 
with concern and disappointment as the executive branch failed to enforce§  2304, have been 
pleasantly surprised by Leahy’s impact.  See, e.g., Human Rights Vetting Hearing, supra note 
43, at 25–26 (statement of Stephen Rickard, Executive Director, Open Society Policy Center) 
(indicating that Leahy enforcement withheld security assistance to 2516 units of foreign 
militaries due to human rights concerns in the three years before 2014); see also Lisa 
Haugaard, The Law That Helps the U.S. Stop Heinous Crimes by Foreign Militaries, SECURITY 
ASSISTANCE MONITOR (May 28, 2015), http://www.securityassistance.org/blog/law-helps-
us-stop-heinous-crimes-foreign-militaries [https://perma.cc/W58C-YQTB] (outlining 
Leahy’s “noteworthy successes” in which “governments bring perpetrators to justice in 
order to receive U.S. security assistance” and pointing to Honduras and Guatemala as 
examples of such successes); Obama Administration Lifts Ban, supra note 66 (highlighting the 
steps taken to address impunity for past human rights abuses in Indonesia before 
resumption of U.S. security assistance).  In just one year, 2011, Leahy barred security 
assistance to 1766 foreign troops allegedly responsible for gross violations of human rights, 
a tremendous accomplishment.  See Schmitt, supra note 65 (indicating that Leahy denied 
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not always brought to justice despite Leahy’s vetting of their units.97  
Flawless enforcement is not the appropriate standard by which to judge 
Leahy; it is an aspirational statute, and its enforcement implicates 
significant national security interests.98  Nevertheless, the analysis that 
follows demonstrates that Leahy, relying only on the State Department’s 
enforcement and congressional oversight, cannot achieve the laudable 
human rights goals it was enacted to accomplish without statutory 
reform.99 
                                                
security assistance to 1766 troops from foreign militaries from forty-six countries based on 
human rights concerns in the three years before 2014).  However, human rights organizations 
continue to express concern about Leahy enforcement failures, noting that U.S. security 
assistance continues to reach human rights abusers in foreign militaries.  See, e.g., TATE, supra 
note 12, at 266 (explaining that several Colombian battalions responsible for gross human 
rights violations were barred from receiving security assistance, yet human rights 
organizations recognized that Leahy was not being fully implemented); KIRK, supra note 37, 
at 261 (detailing how U.S. security assistance was provided to the Colombian military despite 
ongoing collaboration between the military and paramilitary death squads); AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 9, at 6–7 (underscoring that security assistance was delivered to 
units of the Colombian security forces despite credible allegations of a gross violation of 
human rights); FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION & U.S. OFFICE ON COLOMBIA, supra note 73, 
at 35 (asserting that Leahy’s implementation in Colombia indicates that the law is 
insufficient, in some cases, to prevent U.S. security assistance from reaching abusive troops); 
Tenorio Miller, supra note 12, at 685 (positing that continued U.S. security assistance to the 
Colombian military despite credible information alleging gross human rights violations 
suggested Leahy enforcement was nearly a categorical failure in Colombia); Goodman, supra 
note 73 (reporting that Human Rights Watch believed the Colombian military’s role in 
civilian killings required a partial suspension of U.S. security assistance to Colombia). 
97 See supra Part II.B (examining the human rights achievements and failures of Leahy); see 
also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 9, at 6–11 (citing cases in which security assistance 
was delivered to units of the Colombian security forces without effective steps being taken 
to hold abusers accountable for human rights violations); AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE 
COMMITTEE ET AL., supra note 71, at 7 (contending that the United States has not fully 
implemented Leahy Law obligations with regard to security assistance to Israeli security 
forces, including the accountability requirement); Tenorio Miller, supra note 12, at 694 
(describing Leahy’s failure to spur accountability in Colombia, Afghanistan, and the 
Philippines); Obama Administration Lifts Ban, supra note 66 (arguing that Indonesia’s 
government had not taken effective steps to hold human rights abusers accountable and, 
therefore, Leahy’s bar on U.S. security assistance to Indonesia’s Special Forces should not 
have been lifted); Weisbrot, supra note 71 (alleging that U.S. security assistance to the 
Honduran police force violated Leahy due to the persistent allegations of human rights 
abuses tied to the Director General of the Honduran police, who had yet to be held 
accountable for human rights abuses). 
98 160 CONG. REC. S4452 (daily ed. July 14, 2014) (Statement of Senator Leahy) (suggesting 
that Leahy serves key national interests while acknowledging that critics claim that Leahy 
clashes with national security interests by creating “unacceptable obstacles to the ability of 
the U.S. military to engage with foreign counterparts”). 
99 See infra Part III.A–C (assessing the effectiveness of Leahy as currently enforced). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 3 [2017], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol51/iss3/9
2017] Leahy Enforcement 859 
In this section, Part III.A argues that Leahy’s purpose is stymied by 
the lack of an effective accountability mechanism.100  Second, Part III.B 
analyzes the role aggressive congressional oversight has played in 
enforcing Leahy, arguing that congressional oversight is not a sustainable 
solution for robust enforcement.101  Finally, Part III.C evaluates judicial 
enforcement of Leahy, finding that victims of human rights abuses abroad 
cannot currently enforce Leahy through the courts.102 
A. The Lack of an Effective Accountability Mechanism Undermines Leahy’s 
Purpose 
Leahy is not an isolated statute.103  Leahy effectively replaced § 2304’s 
restriction on military aid, which was rendered virtually useless by 
disuse.104  Section 2304’s failure as a mechanism to bar assistance to 
                                                
100 See infra Part III.A (analyzing how Leahy’s purpose of preventing disbursement of U.S. 
military assistance to human rights abusers and encouraging foreign governments to bring 
human rights abusers to justice is stymied by the lack of an effective accountability 
mechanism). 
101 See infra Part III.B (evaluating the role of aggressive congressional oversight of Leahy, 
led by Senator Leahy, and its long-term potential as an enforcement mechanism). 
102 See infra Part III.C (examining key case law and finding that, absent a congressionally-
created private cause of action, the political question doctrine and the challenges in 
establishing standing effectively bar judicial enforcement of Leahy, which point to the need 
for a statutory remedy). 
103 See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (1961) as amended 
through Pub. L. No. 114-113, enacted December 18, 2015 (incorporating all conditions on 
foreign aid, including § 2304 and Leahy).  The Foreign Assistance Act authorizes foreign 
assistance provided in the Foreign Operations Appropriations legislation and “lays out U.S. 
development policy and sets out the conditions under which U.S. foreign assistance is 
given.”  Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, OFF. OF POL’Y PLAN. & PUB. DIPL., BUREAU OF 
DEMOCRACY, HUM. RIGHTS & LAB., OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF ST. (July 1, 2003), 
http://www.humanrights.gov/foreign-assistance-act-of-1961.html [https://perma.cc/ 
52DH-Z6M4].  Leahy is incorporated as § 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.  
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (1961) as amended through Pub. 
L. No. 114-113, enacted December 18, 2015. 
104 See supra Part II.B (describing the relationship between § 2304 and the Leahy Law).  
Senator Leahy stated that it was the failure of § 2304 as a human rights mechanism that drove 
him to develop an “approach that works.”  See Ham, supra note 19 (quoting Senator Leahy’s 
statement that § 2304 was never invoked, which led him to seek an alternative approach that 
would be more effective).  Others have noted that § 2304 was rarely, if ever, invoked to 
restrict U.S. security assistance on human rights grounds.  See, e.g., Human Rights Vetting 
Hearing, supra note 43, at 31 (statement of Stephen Rickard, Executive Director, Open Society 
Policy Center) (highlighting that “the United States has been extremely reluctant to invoke 
Section [2304] even in the most extreme cases”);  STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 33, at 821 
(recognizing that there have been “virtually no cases in which military assistance or foreign 
aid was in fact cut off on human rights grounds”); SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 34, at 3 
(acknowledging the limited use of § 2304 to suspend aid); Tate, supra note 19, at 340 
(contending that § 2304 was never enforced); Powers, supra note 34, at 409 (asserting that 
§ 2304 has rarely been employed to suspend security assistance). 
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abusive security forces is, at least in part, due to its requirement that all 
military assistance to a country be barred based on an adverse human 
rights finding.105  Leahy was enacted as an “intermediate step” that 
triggers a bar on aid only to the “the bad apples,” rather than a country’s 
entire security forces.106  Leahy, therefore, must be viewed as a statutory 
replacement of § 2304’s aid restriction mechanism.107  Since Leahy was 
enacted in 1997, § 2304 has not been referenced in debates on aid to 
security forces with abusive human rights records, much less enforced, 
which buttresses this interpretation.108  Placing Leahy in its appropriate 
statutory context highlights the importance of robust enforcement, as 
Leahy’s goals have subsumed those of § 2304’s security assistance 
limitation mechanism.109 
                                                
105 See Tate, supra note 19, at 340 (explaining the major critique of § 2304, that it barred 
security assistance to an entire country based on the problematic actions of just a few bad 
apples). 
106 See Human Rights Vetting Hearing, supra note 43, at 31 (statement of Stephen Rickard, 
Executive Director, Open Society Policy Center) (acknowledging that Leahy was an 
intermediate step between § 2304’s requirement that all security assistance be cut off and no 
human rights restrictions on security assistance); Tate, supra note 19, at 340 (indicating that 
Leahy’s architects designed the statute to scrutinize units, rather than a blanket review of an 
entire country’s security forces, to address the major critique of § 2304, that it barred security 
assistance to an entire country based on the problematic actions of just a few “bad apples”). 
107 See Ham, supra note 19 (quoting Senator Leahy as stating that § 2304’s failures spurred 
Leahy).  This conclusion is buttressed by Senator Leahy’s own comments indicating he 
intended Leahy to be a replacement for § 2304.  Id.  Senator Leahy said § 2304 was “never 
invoked.”  Id.  The Senator continued, “[i]t was clear to me then, as I read report after report 
of horrific crimes by Central American soldiers and police who were trained and equipped 
by the United States, that we needed a different approach.  We needed an approach that 
works.” Id. 
108 See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 33, at 821 (clarifying that there have been “virtually 
no cases in which military assistance or foreign aid was in fact cut off on human rights 
grounds”); SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 34, at 3 (2014) (stating that § 2304 is 
“rarely . . . invoked” to suspend aid); Tate, supra note 19, at 340 (suggesting § 2304 was never 
enforced); Powers, supra note 34, at 409 (noting § 2304 has rarely been enforced to bar military 
assistance on human rights grounds). 
109 See Ham, supra note 19 (quoting Senator Leahy as stating that § 2304’s failures spurred 
Leahy).  While Leahy has effectively replaced § 2304’s mechanism for restricting foreign 
assistance to human rights violators, there are other country-specific human rights 
conditions on security assistance that complement Leahy and add to the statutory regime.  
See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 109-102, § 556(a), 119 Stat. 2172 (2005) (conditioning Foreign Operations 
Appropriations funds to Colombia on a series of human rights benchmarks); see also HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 37, at 91 (recognizing that Congress added human rights 
conditions on security assistance to Colombia, including the requirement that the Colombian 
Military sever ties with brutal right-wing paramilitary groups, in addition to the existing 
Leahy conditions on security assistance).  The role of Foreign Operations Appropriations 
conditions and their relationship to Leahy is compelling and worthy of analysis, but is 
beyond the scope of this Note. 
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Leahy has achieved a surprising level of success toward its two key 
goals:  (1) preventing disbursement of U.S. military assistance to human 
rights abusers in foreign security forces; and (2) encouraging 
investigations and prosecutions of human rights abusers in foreign 
security forces.110  However, the statute relies exclusively on the State 
Department for enforcement, entrusting State Department bureaucrats to 
make Leahy determinations where foreign policy and national security 
considerations will regularly weigh against robust Leahy enforcement.111  
                                                
110 See 160 CONG. REC. S4452 (daily ed. July 14, 2014) (Statement of Sen. Leahy) (outlining 
Leahy’s two primary goals).  Senator Leahy described Leahy’s first goal as “prevent[ing] U.S. 
taxpayer funded training, equipment, or other assistance from going to units of foreign 
security forces that have committed heinous crimes.”  Id.  Senator Leahy indicated that Leahy 
was needed because “[w]e saw many instances when United States aid ended up in the 
hands of foreign military or police forces that had engaged in rape, murder, torture, or other 
gross violations of human rights, and the U.S. was tainted by association with those crimes.”  
Id. 
 Leahy’s second goal is to “encourage foreign governments to bring to justice the 
individual members of units responsible for [gross violations of human rights].”  Id.  Senator 
Leahy asserted that Leahy was required because “[i]n many countries that receive U.S. aid[,] 
there is a long history of impunity for crimes committed by government security forces.”  Id.  
Leahy is unable to create or catalyze a civilian commitment to extricate impunity, so it relies 
on coercion; impunity is often an entrenched human rights problem and either a major 
civilian commitment, significant coercion, or both are required to eradicate it.  See, e.g., Mary 
Griffin, Ending the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Atrocities:  A Major Challenge for 
International Law in the 21st Century, INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS (June 30, 2000), 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jqhj.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
97QQ-RQHN] (recognizing that impunity is among the most significant human rights 
challenges of the century and requires a major commitment to eradicate it). 
 Leahy’s success toward its two goals comes into relief when compared with the impact 
of § 2304.  See supra Part II.B (comparing the effectiveness of Leahy and § 2304 in barring U.S. 
security assistance foreign security forces accused of gross violations of human rights and 
spurring accountability in such units).  For example, while § 2304 was rarely, if ever, invoked 
to restrict security assistance, Leahy withheld security assistance to 2516 units in foreign 
security forces in just one recent three-year period.  See Human Rights Vetting Hearing, supra 
note 43, at 25–26 (statement of Stephen Rickard, Executive Director, Open Society Policy 
Center) (explaining that Leahy implementation withheld security assistance to 2516 units of 
foreign militaries based on human rights concerns); see also SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 34, at 
3 (stating that § 2304 rarely suspends aid). 
111 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 37, at 96 (concluding that Leahy is not applied 
in a uniform manner; when Leahy enforcement threatens a key national interest, 
enforcement becomes “highly subjective”).  An argument could be made that uneven 
enforcement has been cured by congressional action to suspend U.S. military assistance in 
cases in which the State Department has allegedly failed to fully enforce Leahy. See, e.g., Leahy 
Puts Colombia Aid on Hold, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2007), http://articles.latimes.com/2007/ 
apr/20/world/fg-colombia20 [https://perma.cc/6QAC-9DWN] (clarifying that Senator 
Leahy unilaterally suspended aid to Colombia).  However, ad hoc congressional action, 
while a proper exercise of congressional oversight, is not an adequate substitute for an 
effective statutory regime.  See infra Part III.B (analyzing the role of ad hoc congressional 
oversight as a Leahy enforcement mechanism).  Senator Leahy’s unique position as the 
ranking member of the Senate Appropriations Sub-Committee for State, Foreign Operations, 
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The State Department’s unfettered control over the statutory enforcement 
mechanism creates a conflict of interest that has undermined Leahy’s 
goals.112 
Compared with § 2304, Leahy’s vetting and aid prohibition 
mechanisms have made significant inroads toward Leahy’s dual goals of 
barring aid to abusive security forces and coercing anti-impunity 
efforts.113  Nevertheless, Leahy has been unable to fully realize its goals 
due to uneven enforcement.114  Leahy’s dependence on the State 
                                                
and Related Programs allows him to exercise authority to suspend relatively small amounts 
of assistance as an accountability measure. See Senate Appropriations Sub-Committee for State, 
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Membership, U.S. SENATE, 
http://www.appropriations.senate.gov/subcommittees/state-foreign-operations-and-
related-programs [https://perma.cc/ZN65-GPAU] (providing a list of committee members 
and noting that Senator Leahy is the ranking member of the committee).  Accountability 
beyond ad hoc congressional oversight is crucial because such an accountability mechanism 
is rendered ineffective when a sympathetic member of Congress is no longer in a key position 
to suspend aid unilaterally.  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 37, at 8 (calling for strict 
and consistent Leahy implementation). 
112 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 37, at 96 (acknowledging the tension between robust 
Leahy enforcement and national security interests).  The State Department’s primary mission 
is to execute U.S. foreign policy, with human rights being but one of a number of factors that 
influences foreign policy considerations.  See Phillip R. Trimble, Human Rights and Foreign 
Policy, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 465, 465–66 (2002) (outlining the factors that influence foreign 
policy such as: security interests; economic interests including business, investment, and 
trade; economic development concerns; and human rights).  When these influences come 
into conflict because the State Department must determine whether to suspend security 
assistance pursuant to Leahy despite the significant national security pressures to uphold 
the provision of security assistance, the State Department has made Leahy determinations 
that do not comport with the law.  See, e.g., id. at 466 (contending that the supremacy of other 
foreign policy influences makes it “unrealistic to expect that pure human rights principles 
can always be implemented”).  For example, in the case of Colombia, where the State 
Department failed to robustly enforce Leahy, other foreign policy influences trumped 
Leahy’s human rights provisions.  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 37, at 96 (arguing 
that the State Department was not complying with U.S. law due to its failure to suspend 
security assistance to certain units of the Colombian military because continued funding was 
crucial to U.S. strategy in Colombia). 
113 See, e.g., Human Rights Vetting Hearing, supra note 43, at 25–26, 31 (statement of Stephen 
Rickard, Executive Director, Open Society Policy Center) (recognizing the lack of 
enforcement of § 2304 while noting that Leahy’s enforcement prohibited 2516 units of foreign 
security forces accused of human rights abuses from receiving U.S. security assistance). 
114 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 37, at 96 (asserting that Leahy was unevenly 
enforced and the State Department will circumvent Leahy enforcement if necessary to 
provide security assistance to a unit believed to be important to foreign policy objectives); 
Tate, supra note 19, at 343–45 (describing the choices made by the State Department regarding 
credibility and effective steps to bring perpetrators to justice that allow for varying degrees 
of enforcement); see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 9, at 6–10 (providing examples 
of security assistance being provided to units of the Colombian security forces despite 
credible information that those units were involved in a gross violation of human rights); 
FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION & U.S. OFFICE ON COLOMBIA, supra note 73, at 35 (2010) 
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Department, an entity dedicated to executing the President’s foreign 
policy and national security policies, is the Achilles’ heel in fully achieving 
Leahy’s goals.115 
When foreign policy and national security interests clash with human 
rights concerns, the executive branch will invariably bend human rights 
standards.116  National Security Advisor Susan Rice boldly stated that 
human rights advocates should not count on the executive branch to 
uphold human rights standards in the face of national security concerns: 
[W]e sometimes face painful dilemmas when the 
immediate need to defend our national security clashes 
with our fundamental commitment to democracy and 
human rights.  Let’s be honest:  at times, as a result, we 
do business with governments that do not respect the 
rights we hold most dear.  We make tough choices.  When 
rights are violated, we continue to advocate for their 
protection.  But we cannot, and I will not pretend that 
some short-term tradeoffs do not exist.117 
Ms. Rice suggests that at times the State Department may simply 
disregard human rights requirements, such as Leahy, but more often than 
not, the results are more subtle.118 
                                                
(concluding that the State Department’s failure to fully apply Leahy in Colombia caused U.S. 
security assistance to reach units responsible for gross human rights violations). 
115 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 37, at 8, 96 (concluding that Leahy is not applied 
in a uniform matter; when Leahy enforcement threatens a key national interest, enforcement 
becomes highly subjective and, therefore, calls for consistent and strict enforcement of 
Leahy); Tate, supra note 19, at 343–45 (describing State Department techniques for 
interpreting Leahy’s terms to allow for varying degrees of enforcement). 
116 See, e.g., DEBRA LIANG-FENTON, IMPLEMENTING U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY:  AGENDAS, 
POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 8 (2004) (indicating that human rights concerns are subordinated 
when in conflict with national security interests); William W. Burke-White, Human Rights and 
National Security:  The Strategic Correlation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 249, 249 (2004) (explaining 
that policymakers generally view human rights and national security as in tension and 
subordinate the former to the latter); see also Robert P. Barnidge, Jr., Should National Security 
Trump Human Rights in the Fight against Terrorism?, 37 ISR. Y.B. OF HUM. RTS., 85, 109–10 (2007) 
(exploring the intersection of human rights and national security in the context of the fight 
against terrorism).  President George W. Bush’s National Security Strategy could not have 
stated this fact clearer:  “Defending our [n]ation against its enemies is the first and 
fundamental commitment of the [f]ederal [g]overnment.”  PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (2002). 
117 Susan E. Rice, National Security Advisor, Address at the Human Rights First Annual 
Summit (Dec. 4, 2013). 
118 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 37, at 8, 96 (calling for consistent and strict 
enforcement of Leahy because research showed that Leahy was not evenly enforced when 
consistent enforcement threatened a key strategic interest); Tate, supra note 19, at 343–45 
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Even with Congress’s best efforts to draft Leahy to ensure proper 
enforcement, the State Department created ambiguities in the statute’s 
language to allow for less restrictive enforcement when foreign policy and 
national security considerations trump Leahy’s human rights concerns.119  
For example, despite congressional efforts to clarify the term “credible,” 
the State Department manipulates its definition to ensure enforcement 
flexibility.120  Similarly, the State Department’s view of what constitutes 
effective steps to investigate and punish perpetrators of human rights 
abuses varies arbitrarily.121  Not surprisingly, there is not unanimity in the 
State Department regarding Leahy enforcement.122  The Democracy, 
Rights, and Labor Bureau’s opinion on Leahy enforcement predictably can 
be at variance with the view of the Western Hemisphere Bureau.123 
Broadening Leahy enforcement beyond the narrow confines of the 
State Department, where non-human rights considerations may corrupt 
the process, would provide a correction for some of these enforcement 
problems.124  A private cause of action to enjoin the State Department to 
enforce Leahy would significantly reduce the risk of weak Leahy 
                                                
(noting that fungible language provides the State Department’s different actors the ability to 
massage Leahy standards to their desired level of enforcement). 
119 See Tate, supra note 19, at 343–45 (explaining the usage of “credible” and “effective 
steps” to vary the impact of Leahy enforcement). 
120 See id. at 343–44 (describing how what constitutes “credible” information can vary 
within the State Department). 
121 See id. at 344–45 (analyzing how the State Department determines what constitutes 
“effective steps”). 
122 See id. at 344 (conceding that at times there may be a conflict between the regional and 
thematic bureaus in the State Department regarding Leahy implementation).  The State 
Department’s Democracy, Rights, and Labor Bureau is charged with leading Leahy vetting, 
the key enforcement component.  SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 34, at 7.  In theory, the State 
Department’s regional bureaus contribute to the vetting process as required.  Id.  However, 
in practice the regional bureaus insert themselves into the process frequently, arguing that 
they have greater expertise with which to make credibility determinations on information 
on alleged human rights abuses.  See Tate, supra note 19, at 344 (recounting a State 
Department official’s comments on regional bureaus’ efforts to insert themselves into Leahy 
determinations, undermining the Democracy, Rights, and Labor Bureau’s leadership on 
Leahy vetting). 
123 See Tate, supra note 19, at 344 (acknowledging the different bureaus’ conflicting 
assessments of the human rights performance of Colombian military troops related to the 
different constituencies to which the bureaus responded).  This conflict can be seen in other 
contexts as well.  See, e.g., Symposium, The Making of Filártiga v. Peña:  The Alien Tort Claims 
Act after Twenty-Five Years, 9 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 249, 257 (2006) (recognizing a conflict between 
a regional bureau and the Democracy, Rights, and Labor Bureau relating to a TVPA Supreme 
Court case). 
124 See infra Part IV (arguing that a private cause of action to enforce Leahy would 
democratize Leahy enforcement and check the State Department’s uneven application of the 
statute). 
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enforcement while empowering human rights victims.125  Absent a private 
cause of action, Leahy has relied on strong congressional oversight and 
transparent reporting on Leahy vetting decisions to pressure the State 
Department to robustly enforce existing Leahy Law mechanisms.126 
B. Aggressive Congressional Involvement in Leahy Enforcement is Not a Long-
Term Solution for Robust Enforcement 
Congress has played an aggressive role in ensuring Leahy is more 
successful than § 2304, but Congress’s oversight limitations suggest the 
need for judicial review.127  Congress has shown a keen interest in 
improving Leahy’s effectiveness, extending and amending the law to 
mitigate concerns.128  Meanwhile, members of Congress, specifically 
                                                
125 See id. (proposing a private cause of action for Leahy enforcement). 
126 See infra Part III.B (analyzing the role of congressional oversight in Leahy enforcement). 
127 See, e.g., Letter from 108 members of Congress to Secretary of State John Kerry (May 28, 
2014) [hereinafter Letter to Secretary Kerry] (describing human rights concerns in Honduras 
and asking Secretary Kerry to “fully enforce the Leahy Law”); see also Letter from Ninety-
Four Members of Congress to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (Mar. 9, 2012) [hereinafter 
Letter to Secretary Clinton] (highlighting the human rights situation in Honduras and noting 
that the State Department “has an obligation to vigorously enforce the Leahy provisions”); 
Letter from Representative McCollum, supra note 87 (raising concerns about the Israeli 
security forces’ alleged killing of a Palestinian and calling on the State Department to 
investigate whether Leahy is implicated).  Senator Leahy himself, in his role as Chair or 
Ranking Member of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, 
and Related Programs, has unilaterally suspended U.S. security assistance due to human 
rights concerns.  See, e.g., Paul Richter, Senate Subcommittee Chairman Blocks $650 Million in 
Aid for Egypt, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/world/africa/la-fg-wn-
egypt-aid-blocked-senate-leahy-20140429-story.html [https://perma.cc/HP6U-WE74] 
(reporting on Senator Leahy’s Senate floor speech announcing that he would block $650 
million in security assistance to Egypt due to human rights concerns); Ben Smith, Leahy Says 
Legislation Doesn’t Aim at Israel, but Could Hit It, POLITICO (Aug. 16, 2011), 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/ben-smith/2011/08/leahy-says-legislation-doesnt-aim-
at-israel-but-could-hit-it-038422 [https://perma.cc/3VCC-GW5E] (quoting Senator Leahy’s 
spokesperson, David Carle, as stating that Senator Leahy vigorously advocates for full and 
consistent Leahy enforcement); Patrick Markey, U.S. Senator Freezes Colombia Aid on Rights 
Concerns, REUTERS (Apr. 19, 2007), http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN1930146220070419 
[https://perma.cc/V8NK-TP4B] (confirming that Senator Leahy suspended $55.2 million in 
security assistance for Colombia based on human rights concerns); SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY, 
Comment of Senator Patrick Leahy on Mexico and the Leahy Law, 
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/comment-of-senator-patrick-leahy-on-mexico-and-
the-leahy-law [https://perma.cc/J3KB-6KRU] [hereinafter Comment of Senator Leahy] 
(advocating for robust enforcement of Leahy with regards to security assistance to Mexico 
due to the Mexican security forces’ long history of human rights violations). 
128 See SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 34, at 3–4 (outlining the language of the original version 
of Leahy and the subsequent amendments to the law).  Leahy was originally a rider on the 
Foreign Operations Appropriations legislation and thus applied only to funds channeled 
through the State Department and required affirmative congressional action to annually 
renew the measure.  See Pub. L. No. 105-118, § 570, 111 Stat. 2386 (1997) (applying only to 
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Senator Leahy himself, have provided aggressive oversight over Leahy 
enforcement, even unilaterally suspending aid to ensure Leahy 
compliance when the State Department has failed to properly enforce the 
statute.129  While Congress’s substantial engagement with Leahy has 
ensured the legislation is more effective than § 2304, there are limitations 
to these avenues, and only a statutory remedy that allows for judicial 
review of Leahy enforcement can ensure proper oversight.130 
Congress has adapted Leahy on numerous occasions to improve its 
effectiveness, including significant amendments in 2011 and 2014 aimed 
at addressing a serious flaw in the statute, but absent judicial review, 
Leahy’s enforcement problems will continue.131  Human rights 
                                                
funds subject to the Foreign Operations Appropriations legislation); see also SERAFINO ET AL., 
supra note 34, at 3 (acknowledging the limited application of the original Leahy measure).  
Congress later incorporated a similar measure into the Defense Department Appropriations 
legislation and codified the Foreign Operations Appropriations version of the measure.  See 
Pub. L. No. 105-262, § 8130, 112 Stat. 2279 (1998) (containing a Leahy provision applicable to 
Defense Department appropriations, albeit a narrower category of assistance than that 
covered by the codified version of Leahy); 22 U.S.C. § 2378d (2012) (codifying the Foreign 
Operations Appropriations version of Leahy).  In 2011, Leahy was amended to change and 
redefine some terms, clarify Congress’s vetting requirements, and add a reporting 
mechanism.  See Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 7034(k), 125 Stat. 1216 (2011) (amending Leahy to 
change the term evidence to information and editing some other terms, defining the 
“credible information” requirement, and requiring unit vetting when considering training 
an individual).  This amendment attempted to correct a substantial problem with vetting for 
U.S. security assistance for training.  See SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 34, at 8 (explaining the 
State Department’s individual-level scrutiny for training assistance before the 2011 
amendment); Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 7034(k), 125 Stat. 1216 (2011) (requiring that the entire 
unit be vetted, rather than just the individual, when individual training assistance is 
proposed).  In 2014, Congress extended this solution to training assistance to apply to all 
assistance.  See Pub. L. No. 113-76, § 7034(l), 128 Stat. 515 (2014) (modifying Leahy to ensure 
that the entire unit is vetted even if the security assistance is targeted at an individual). 
129 See, e.g., Letter to Secretary Kerry, supra note 127 (calling on Secretary Kerry to “fully 
enforce the Leahy Law” in Honduras); Letter to Secretary Clinton, supra note 127 (advocating 
for a vigorous enforcement of Leahy in Honduras); Letter from Representative McCollum, 
supra note 87 (requesting that the State Department investigate whether Leahy was being 
enforced properly with respect to Israel); Richter, supra note 127 (reporting that Senator 
Leahy would block $650 million in security assistance to Egypt due to human rights 
concerns); Smith, supra note 127 (recognizing that Senator Leahy vigorously advocates for 
full and consistent Leahy enforcement). 
130 See infra Part IV (arguing that Leahy’s inherent limitations require a statutory remedy 
that would allow for third party Leahy enforcement via a private cause of action). 
131 See SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 34, at 3–4 (describing the original Leahy legislation and 
subsequent amendments).  Leahy was originally a rider on the annual Foreign Operations 
Appropriations funding measure and, therefore, applied only to security assistance 
provided by the State Department and required affirmative congressional action to annually 
renew the measure.  See Pub. L. No. 105-118, § 507, 111 Stat. 2386 (1997) (imposing human 
rights restrictions on U.S. security assistance but applying only to funds appropriated in that 
legislation); see also SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 34, at 3 (recognizing that the original Leahy 
measure was limited in scope).  Congress subsequently codified the Foreign Operations 
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organizations raised concerns that the State Department was releasing 
security assistance to tainted units by vetting only the individual troops 
within the unit that would receive assistance, such as training.132  In 
response, Congress took statutory action to reverse the State Department’s 
interpretation that an individual could be considered a unit.133  This 
statutory reform closed a loophole exploited by the State Department, but 
failed to address the underlying problem:  depending exclusively on the 
State Department, with its inherent conflict of interest, for Leahy 
enforcement.134  Recognizing the inherent problems independent State 
Department enforcement presents and the failure of statutory 
amendments aimed at perfecting Leahy’s language to ensure robust State 
                                                
Appropriations version of the measure and incorporated a similar measure into the Defense 
Department Appropriations legislation.  See § 2378d (codifying Leahy’s Foreign Operations 
Appropriations version in the U.S. Code); Pub. L. No. 105-262, § 8130, 112 Stat. 2279 (1998) 
(containing the Leahy provision applicable to security assistance provided through the 
Defense Department Appropriations legislation).  Leahy was amended in 2011 to remedy a 
loophole employed by the State Department to avoid vetting an entire unit when proposing 
training for an individual, as well as some other modifications.  See Pub. L. No. 112-74, 
§ 7034(k), 125 Stat. 1216 (2011) (altering Leahy to ensure units are vetted when training for 
an individual is proposed, redefine some terms, and add a reporting mechanism); SERAFINO 
ET AL., supra note 34, at 8 (detailing the State Department’s individual-level scrutiny for 
training assistance before the 2011 amendment and the amendment’s impact).  In 2014, 
Congress amended Leahy to ensure that units, rather than individuals, were being vetted for 
all assistance.  See Pub. L. No. 113-76, § 7034(l), 128 Stat. 515 (2014) (amending Leahy to 
require unit-level vetting even if the security assistance is targeted at an individual). 
132 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 37, at 95 (explaining that the U.S. 
Ambassador to Colombia and the Colombian military sought to transfer two officers 
allegedly responsible for human rights abuses out of a unit to circumvent Leahy); see also 
Tenorio Miller, supra note 12, at 672 (citing a 1999 State Department cable indicating that if 
an individual is to be trained, then the individual, not the unit, should be vetted). 
133 See Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 7034(k), 125 Stat. 1216 (2011) (changing the State Department’s 
narrow interpretation by stating that “when vetting an individual for eligibility to receive 
United States training the individual’s unit is also vetted”).  In 2014, Congress acted again to 
ensure that this broader interpretation of unit would not be limited to the training context.  
See Pub. L. No. 113-76, § 7034(l), 128 Stat. 515 (2014) (extending the requirement that a unit 
be vetted for any U.S. security assistance).  Leahy now states that “when an individual is 
designated to receive United States training, equipment, or other types of assistance, the 
individual’s unit is vetted as well as the individual.”  22 U.S.C. § 2378d(d)(5). 
134 See SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 34, at n.24 (quoting a Senate Appropriations Committee 
report accompanying the 2011 amendment that criticized the State Department’s 
interpretation of a unit as an individual).  The Senate Appropriations Committee had harsh 
words for the State Department and its narrow interpretation of the unit as an individual in 
certain circumstances, saying it was “contrary to the letter and intent of the law and has 
limited its effectiveness.”  S. REP. NO. 112-85, at 15 (2011)   The Committee further 
reprimanded the State Department, saying it “expects the [State] Department to implement 
the law faithfully and effectively.”  Id. 
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Department enforcement, Congress, and Senator Leahy specifically, has 
taken on an unusually active oversight role.135 
If Senator Leahy believed the State Department could be trusted to 
effectively enforce Leahy, then his vigorous oversight of the State 
Department’s Leahy enforcement would be unnecessary.136  However, 
Senator Leahy, who wields significant power over the State Department’s 
budget and foreign assistance generally, has taken advantage of his 
unique position to pressure the State Department.137  He has served as 
either the chairman or the ranking member of the Senate Appropriations 
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs for 
over twenty years, a position that allows him to unilaterally cut off 
portions of foreign assistance.138  Lax Leahy enforcement by the State 
Department requires substantial oversight by Senator Leahy, even forcing 
him to freeze foreign assistance to security forces that appear to be 
running afoul of Leahy.139 
                                                
135 See Ham, supra note 19 (recounting a quote by Senator Leahy stating that Leahy is not 
an easy law to apply, at least in part due to the national security interests at stake).  On 
numerous occasions, members of Congress have sent letters to the Secretary of State, alerting 
the State Department to allegations of gross violations of human rights committed by units 
of foreign security forces, calling on the State Department to enforce Leahy and prohibit such 
units from receiving U.S. security assistance.  See, e.g., Letter to Secretary Kerry, supra note 
127 (outlining human rights abuses by units of the Honduran security forces and requesting 
that the State Department “fully enforce the Leahy Law”); Letter to Secretary Clinton, supra 
note 127 (calling on the State Department to vigorously enforce Leahy in Honduras); Letter 
from Representative McCollum, supra note 87 (appealing to the State Department to review 
whether Leahy was being properly enforced with respect to security assistance to the Israeli 
defense force). 
136 See Smith, supra note 127 (quoting Senator Leahy’s spokesperson, David Carle, as 
stating that Senator Leahy vigorously advocates for full and consistent Leahy enforcement).  
While Senator Leahy’s general human rights advocacy and his responsibility for other 
human rights measures has contributed to his unilateral suspension of security assistance, 
his desire to ensure Leahy is rigorously enforced is a driving force behind many of his efforts.  
See, e.g., Comment of Senator Leahy, supra note 127 (describing the Mexican military’s dismal 
human rights record and stating that “no one in Congress has worked harder than I have to 
keep our aid to Mexico from going to those who commit such crimes.  I will continue to do 
that.”). 
137 See STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS, Jurisdiction, 
http://www.appropriations.senate.gov/subcommittees/state-foreign-operations-and-
related-programs [https://perma.cc/ZN65-GPAU] (highlighting the programs subject to 
the Subcommittee’s jurisdiction). 
138 See SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY, Foreign Assistance, https://www.leahy.senate.gov/ 
issues/foreign-assistance [https://perma.cc/3NT3-FTGQ] (explaining that Senator Leahy 
has been the Chair or Ranking Member of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, 
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs for more than two decades). 
139 See Richter, supra note 127 (detailing Senator Leahy’s Senate floor speech in which he 
announced he would block $650 million in security assistance to Egypt due to human rights 
concerns); Smith, supra note 127 (quoting Senator Leahy’s spokesperson, David Carle, as 
saying “the State Department is responsible for [Leahy] evaluations and enforcement 
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Senator Leahy’s actions are laudable and unsurprising given his long 
history advocating for human rights and his desire to see his legislation 
enforced; however, this approach is not a long-term solution to Leahy’s 
enforcement problems.140  First, Senator Leahy has only frozen assistance 
in extreme cases, and in other cases, security assistance has continued in 
an apparent violation of Leahy.141  Second, a single Senator, no matter how 
influential and steadfast, cannot be depended on to single-handedly 
guarantee Leahy enforcement oversight.142  However, allowing human 
                                                
decisions and over the years Senator Leahy has pressed for faithful and consistent 
application of the law”); Markey, supra note 127 (recounting that Senator Leahy suspended 
$55.2 million in security assistance destined for Colombian human rights concerns); Comment 
of Senator Leahy, supra note 127 (clarifying that the State Department is responsible for 
enforcing Leahy and that Senator Leahy “hopes and expects that they will”).  The Senator’s 
statement said:  “the Mexican Army and police have a long history of violating human rights 
with impunity, and no one in Congress has worked harder than I have to keep our aid to 
Mexico from going to those who commit such crimes.  I will continue to do that.”  Id. 
140 See, e.g., Eclipse Award, CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF TORTURE (June 2015), 
http://www.cvt.org/sites/cvt.org/files/attachments/u11/downloads/Eclipse%20Award
%20Recipients%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZWJ-QKDB] (highlighting a selection of 
Senator Leahy’s numerous human rights achievements).  Senator Leahy is up for re-election 
in 2016 and, even if he wins the election and returns to Washington, he is closer to the end of 
his career than the beginning.  See Alexander Bolton, 2016 Retirements Could Complicate Dems’ 
Comeback Plans, HILL (Nov. 28, 2014), http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/225488-
2016-retirements-could-complicate-dems-comeback-plans [https://perma.cc/FJX3-WASL] 
(noting that Senator Leahy is up for re-election in 2016); SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY, Biography, 
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/about [https://perma.cc/QF2U-ZE4V] [hereinafter Senator 
Leahy Biography] (relating that Senator Leahy is seventy-six years old and has served in the 
Senate for forty-two years).  While there are other members of Congress that strongly 
advocate for human rights, it is unusual to have such a senior member of Congress remain 
in a key leadership position on the sub-committee that holds the purse strings on foreign aid 
for over two decades and be willing to expend significant political capital by unilaterally 
suspending foreign aid on human rights grounds.  See, e.g., Congressman Jim McGovern, 
Human Rights, http://mcgovern.house.gov/issues/human-rights [https://perma.cc/ 
W7JQ-S2MA] (describing Congressman Jim McGovern as “one of the foremost voices for 
human rights in Congress”). 
141 Compare Markey, supra note 127 (stating that Senator Leahy suspended $55.2 million in 
security assistance destined for Colombia due to human rights concerns), with AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 9, at 6–11 (citing cases in which units of the Colombian security 
forces were credibly accused of a gross human rights violation, yet security assistance was 
provided to the unit despite the allegation); FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION & U.S. OFFICE 
ON COLOMBIA, supra note 73, at 36 (recognizing Leahy failed to halt U.S. security assistance 
to abusive troops); TATE, supra note 12, at 266 (explaining that human rights groups believed 
Leahy was not being fully enforced in Colombia, even though several Colombian battalions 
saw U.S. security assistance suspended due to Leahy; human rights groups insisted that 
Leahy was “not being fully implemented”); Tenorio Miller, supra note 12, at 685 (arguing 
that human rights data suggested Leahy was nearly a categorical failure in Colombia); 
Goodman, supra note 73 (publishing Human Rights Watch’s call for a partial suspension of 
U.S. security assistance to Colombia over the Colombian military’s role in civilian killings). 
142 See Bolton, supra note 140 (reporting that Senator Leahy is one of the most senior 
members of the Senate and is up for re-election in 2016).  Senator Leahy was elected to the 
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rights victims themselves, a singularly motivated group, to challenge 
uneven State Department enforcement in U.S. federal court could 
effectively remedy Leahy’s intractable enforcement problems.143  
Recognizing the limitations of perfecting the legislative language to 
ensure enforcement and congressional oversight of executive branch 
enforcement of human rights restrictions on foreign security assistance, 
determined individuals and victims of human rights abuses have turned 
to the courts to enjoin enforcement.144 
C. Judicial Enforcement of Leahy 
An analysis of relevant case law indicates that, absent congressional 
action to create a private cause of action for enforcement, judicial 
enforcement of human rights conditions on foreign military assistance is 
improbable.145  A Central District of California case and other analogous 
cases demonstrate that the political question doctrine and a potential 
plaintiff’s lack of standing render Leahy judicially unenforceable at this 
time, suggesting the need for a statutory remedy.146 
                                                
Senate in 1974 and is seventy-five years old; at some point he will leave the Senate.  See 
Senator Leahy Biography, supra note 140 (providing biographical information on Senator 
Leahy, including his age). 
143 See supra Part IV (arguing that a private cause of action to enforce Leahy is a feasible 
and effective solution to the uneven enforcement of Leahy under the exclusive control of the 
State Department). 
144 See supra Part II.C (describing efforts of judicial enforcement of human rights 
restrictions on U.S. security assistance). 
145 See Tenorio Miller, supra note 12, at 694 (concluding that it would be virtually 
impossible to successfully sue to enforce Leahy after analyzing the possibilities for judicial 
enforcement of Leahy). 
146 See, e.g., Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529–30 (1988) (acknowledging courts 
must show utmost deference to the executive branch in the areas of national security, foreign 
policy, and military affairs because they are the province and responsibility of the executive 
branch); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 170 (1974) (determining that the claimant 
in a suit challenging the CIA’s financial reporting); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 575 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (recognizing that courts must treat executive action on foreign policy, military 
affairs, and national security matters with deference); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 
1356–57 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (upholding the District Court’s dismissal of a suit by members of 
Congress to enjoin security assistance to El Salvador, holding that the claim was barred by 
the political question doctrine); Abusharar v. Hagel, 77 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1006 (C.D. Cal. 2014) 
(granting a motion to dismiss a suit brought under Leahy in which the plaintiff sought a 
suspension of U.S. security assistance to the Israeli defense forces). 
 Even if, arguendo, the political question doctrine, standing, and sovereign immunity 
were not barriers to judicial relief, the Chevron doctrine would be an obstacle to most Leahy 
suits.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) 
(articulating the Chevron doctrine of judicial deference to an agency determination).  In most 
suits seeking to enforce human rights conditions on military assistance, a plaintiff sues for 
an injunction against aid to an abusive foreign military force.  See, e.g., Crockett, 720 F.2d at 
1356 (outlining the plaintiffs’ claims, including their request for an injunction against further 
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Absent congressional action specifically authorizing a private cause of 
action to enforce Leahy, the political question doctrine would stymie any 
Leahy challenge.147  Courts are exceedingly deferential to the executive 
branch regarding issues of national security, foreign policy, and military 
affairs, all of which are implicated by Leahy.148  In Abusharar v. Hagel, the 
court declared that Leahy enforcement was a “quintessential political 
question” and held that “the decision to provide military support to a 
foreign nation” is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court.149  The 
                                                
security assistance to El Salvador).  If such a suit were brought under Leahy and it was not 
dismissed due to the political question doctrine or a lack of standing, the court would 
examine the case on the merits.  See Abusharar, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1007 (dismissing a suit under 
Leahy due to lack of standing and the political question doctrine).  Under Leahy, the focus 
of the inquiry would be on whether the State Department properly vetted the unit in question 
and whether the individuals in the unit were properly vetted.  See SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 
34, at 7–10 (recounting the importance of the vetting process in Leahy enforcement).  
However, Congress did not directly address the vetting process in the statute.  See 22 U.S.C. 
§ 2378d(d)(5) (2012) (mentioning only that an individual’s unit must be vetted even when 
only the individual is to receive security assistance).  The vetting process was delegated to 
the State Department.  See SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 34, at 9 (detailing that, while vetting is 
a multi-stage process with input from various agencies, it is led by the State Department).  
Under Chevron, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction 
of the statute.” Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 837.  Thus, even a suit on the merits that 
survived a motion to dismiss would be unlikely to survive summary judgment under 
Chevron.  See SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 34, at 7 (recognizing that the State Department has 
developed the vetting policy as it is not described in the statute). 
147 See, e.g., Abusharar, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1006–07 (dismissing a suit to enjoin Leahy 
enforcement on political question grounds, among others).  The Supreme Court has 
consistently held that a case “involves a political question . . . where there is a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; 
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.”  Zivotofsky 
ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The political question doctrine was first articulated in Marbury v. Madison.  See Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 166 (1803) (holding that the President has “important political powers” 
that he is to exercise at this own discretion and, thus, “is accountable only to his country in 
his political character, and to his own conscience”); see also Baxter, supra note 79, at 826 
(recognizing that the political question doctrine is “a mechanism by which a court declines 
to hear a case that deals with issues more properly belonging before one of the ‘political’ 
branches of government”).  Baker v. Carr provided the modern political question doctrine 
test.  369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
148 See, e.g., Dep’t of the Navy, 484 U.S. at 529 (concluding that the courts should show the 
“utmost deference” to the executive branch on matters implicating national security, foreign 
policy, and military affairs because they are the province and responsibility of the executive 
branch); Arar, 585 F.3d at 575 (explaining that the Supreme Court counseled lower courts to 
refrain from intruding into matters constitutionally delegated to the executive branch, such 
as national security and foreign affairs).  Leahy enforcement implicates all three of the issues 
cited by the Court as requiring the utmost deference:  national security, foreign policy, and 
military affairs.  See SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 34, at 1 (noting that Leahy implicates 
important national interests). 
149 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1006. 
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predictable result in Abusharar would be the outcome in any judicial action 
to enforce Leahy; absent congressional action to expressly authorize 
judicial action, Leahy enforcement in U.S. courts is foreclosed by the 
political question doctrine.150 
Without a congressionally authorized private cause of action, any suit 
by a plaintiff seeking judicial enforcement of Leahy would be dismissed 
due to a lack of standing.151  For a plaintiff to have standing to sue for 
enforcement of Leahy, she would bear the burden of demonstrating that 
she has a “personal stake” in an existing controversy.152  A Leahy plaintiff 
must show that she “has suffered an injury in fact that is caused by the 
conduct complained of and that will be redressed by a favorable decision”; 
however, today a court would find that a Leahy claim is simply a general 
harm that could be better redressed by a coordinate branch of 
government.153  A Leahy claimant cannot show that the threat of future 
harm is “sufficiently real and immediate to show an existing controversy” 
because the risk of repetition is extraordinarily remote.154  Of particular 
importance for a Leahy claimant, the Supreme Court has held that “past 
exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or 
controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any 
                                                
150 See, e.g., Dep’t of the Navy, 484 U.S. at 529  (acknowledging that national security, foreign 
policy, and military affairs are the province and responsibility of the executive branch; 
therefore, the courts show the “utmost deference” to the executive branch in these areas); 
Arar, 585 F.3d at 575 (recognizing that courts must hesitate to adjudicate cases that deal with 
foreign policy, military affairs, or national security, absent congressional authorization); 
Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1355 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a suit to enjoin security 
assistance on political question doctrine grounds); Abusharar, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1006–07 
(dismissing a suit brought under Leahy to enjoin military assistance to Israel due to the 
political question doctrine). 
151 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499–500 (1975) (demanding a plaintiff assert her 
own legal rights, and not simply those of public interest that other branches of government 
are better positioned to resolve, to establish standing); Abusharar, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1007 
(determining that the plaintiff, a Palestinian-American lawyer bringing suit under Leahy in 
federal court to enjoin further U.S. security assistance to the Israeli defense force, lacked 
standing). 
152 Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2028 (2011); see Warth, 422 U.S. at 499–500 (requiring 
a plaintiff assert legal rights rather than general interests better resolved by other branches 
of government). 
153 Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2028; see Abusharar, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1007 (granting a motion to 
dismiss because the plaintiff lacked standing to bring a suit to judicially enforce Leahy 
because he did not demonstrate injury in fact, causation, and redressability). 
154 City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 (1983).  The key to a suit to judicially enforce 
Leahy is the Court’s requirement that there be a threat of future harm, not just past harm.  Id.  
Therefore, a Leahy claimant would have to show not just that they were somehow harmed 
by continued U.S. security assistance to the local military, but that such an injury was likely 
to repeat in the future.  See Abusharar, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1007 (holding that the plaintiff must 
show injury in fact, causation, and redressability). 
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continuing, present adverse effects.”155  A compelling Leahy plaintiff may 
persuasively allege past harm, but demonstrating a real and immediate 
threat of future harm due to a failure to enforce Leahy would be 
exceedingly difficult.156 
Abusharar, the only attempt at judicial enforcement of Leahy, 
demonstrates what would likely be the result of any other judicial 
enforcement efforts; virtually any conceivable Leahy plaintiff would lack 
standing before the court to challenge the statute.157  Due to the inherent 
difficulty with establishing standing in a Leahy enforcement action, it is 
unsurprising that the court found Abusharar lacked standing in his 
case.158  In Abusharar, the only case on point, the plaintiff attempted to 
establish standing by alleging an injury caused by the continued provision 
of United States-supplied weapons to the Israeli defense force despite 
credible allegations of gross violations of human rights.159  However, the 
court dismissed Abusharar’s suit for an injunction against military aid to 
Israel, simply stating that he failed to demonstrate injury in fact, causation, 
and redressability.160  Establishing standing presents a nearly 
                                                
155 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 103. 
156 See Abusharar, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1007 (granting a motion to dismiss a claimant’s attempt 
to judicially enforce Leahy because the claimant failed to demonstrate injury in fact, 
causation, and redressability, and, therefore, failed to establish standing). 
157 See id. (dismissing a suit to judicially enforce Leahy because the claimant failed to 
establish standing by demonstrating injury in fact, causation, and redressability); United 
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 171 (1974) (finding that the plaintiff failed to establish 
standing to maintain a suit challenging the constitutionality of the CIA’s financial reporting).  
A plaintiff that could even theoretically establish standing would likely be a foreign national 
living in a war zone targeted by United States military assistance; however, a suit by a foreign 
national would be barred by sovereign immunity.  Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 
202, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“It would make a mockery of the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
if federal courts were authorized to sanction or enjoin . . . actions that are, concededly and as 
a jurisdictional necessity, official actions of the United States.”). 
158 See Abusharar, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1006 (holding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim on 
which relief could be granted because he lacked standing).  Abusharar’s outcome was 
predictable given the court’s approach in other similar cases.  See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U.S. 490, 499–500 (1975) (requiring that a plaintiff assert her own legal rights, and not simply 
those of public interest that other branches of government are better positioned to resolve, 
to establish standing). 
159 Abusharar, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1006.  In many ways, Abusharar was a uniquely positioned 
Leahy claimant; he was a Palestinian-American living in California and thus presumably 
paying federal taxes that were being used to fund foreign security forces.  Id.  Yet he had a 
home and family in the Gaza Strip.  Id.  Furthermore, he had allegedly suffered an injury due 
to the actions of a foreign security force that was funded by U.S. security assistance.  Id.  
Abusharar claimed that his Gaza Strip home had recently been destroyed in a bombing by 
the Israeli military and his father had died as a result of the Israeli siege of Gaza.  Id. 
160 Abusharar, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1006.  Without a private cause of action to enforce Leahy, 
this result was predictable and likely the reason Abusharar is the only case on point.  See infra 
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insurmountable obstacle to obtaining judicial relief under Leahy without 
a clear indication from Congress authorizing private actions to enforce 
Leahy.161  However, just as with the political question doctrine, 
congressional action to create a private cause of action to enforce Leahy in 
U.S. courts would eliminate the standing problem for potential 
claimants.162 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
Leahy’s purpose, the ad-hoc nature of congressional oversight, and 
the lack of available judicial review requires congressional action to 
remedy the statutory deficiencies described in this Note.  A private cause 
of action would eliminate the judicial barriers to Leahy enforcement in 
federal courts and democratize Leahy enforcement by allowing victims to 
enjoin further security assistance to the perpetrators who committed the 
violations until effective steps are taken to punish them.163  Such a cause 
of action should be enacted as part of the TVPA because it would 
complement and enhance the remedy provided by the TVPA to the 
victims of human rights abuses.  The cause of action would also further 
the goals of Leahy by providing a backstop to ensure that no security 
assistance is provided to human rights abusers even when the State 
                                                
Part IV (proposing a private cause of action to enforce Leahy as a solution to the obstacles to 
judicial enforcement). 
161 See Abusharar, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1006 (holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to 
maintain a suit to judicially enforce Leahy); see also infra Part IV (positing that a private cause 
of action to enforce Leahy would eliminate the obstacles to judicial enforcement). 
162 See infra Part IV (analyzing the impact of a congressionally created private cause of 
action to enforce Leahy and its impact on current obstacles to judicial enforcement, standing, 
and the political question doctrine). 
163 See Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (accepting that review of national 
security and foreign affairs is justiciable, despite deference to the executive branch’s 
constitutional authority in these areas, when Congress has specifically authorized judicial 
review).  Today a court would undoubtedly dismiss a Leahy enforcement action, as the 
Central District of California court did in Abusharar.  See 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1006 (dismissing a 
suit to enjoin military assistance to Israel due to lack of standing and the political question 
doctrine).  However, express congressional authorization of such an action by amending the 
TVPA to incorporate a private cause of action to enforce Leahy would satisfy the Court’s 
requirement of congressional authorization of judicial review of matters typically subject to 
the political question doctrine.  See Dep’t of the Navy, 484 U.S. at 530 (indicating that when 
Congress specifically authorizes judicial review, national security, foreign policy, and 
military affairs may be subject to judicial review); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 575 (2d Cir. 
2009) (recognizing that judicial barriers to judicial review of foreign policy and national 
security matters are eliminated by congressional authorization of judicial review).  The 
standing problems presented by a Leahy enforcement action are similarly remedied by 
congressional action to create an express cause of action.  See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 501 (1975) (accepting that “Congress may grant an express right of action to persons 
who would otherwise be barred by prudential standing rules”). 
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Department declines to enforce Leahy due to a conflict of interest with the 
national security or foreign policy priorities.164  Congress should enact a 
private cause of action to enforce Leahy as an amendment to the TVPA to 
underscore that the measure is a complement to the remedies currently 
available to human rights victims under U.S. law. 
This Note proposes a simple, yet powerful, amendment to the TVPA 
to create a private cause of action to enjoin the State Department to enforce 
Leahy that would significantly enhance the statute’s effectiveness.  This 
amendment complements the existing private cause of action already 
available under the TVPA while adding a powerful tool for human rights 
victims to further the goals of Leahy:  barring U.S. security assistance to 
human rights abusers and promoting accountability for human rights 
abuses.  First, Part IV.A proposes an amendment to the TVPA to 
incorporate a private cause of action to enforce Leahy.165  Next, Part IV.B 
provides commentary on the proposed amendment and addresses 
possible counterarguments.166 
A. Proposed Amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1350 Note (Torture Victim Protection) 
The TVPA created a private cause of action to seek damages to redress 
certain human rights abuses abroad; adding a private cause of action to 
enjoin the State Department to enforce Leahy would be a logical expansion 
of the statute. 
SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL ACTION 
(a) LIABILITY.—An individual who, under actual or 
apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign 
nation— 
(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, 
be liable for damages to that individual; or 
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in 
a civil action, be liable for damages to the individual's 
legal representative, or to any person who may be a 
claimant in an action for wrongful death. 
(b) EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES.—A court shall decline 
to hear a claim under this section if the claimant has not 
                                                
164 See Rice, supra note 117 (recognizing that the U.S. government advocates for human 
rights, but human rights advocacy will bow to national security interests when the two 
clash). 
165 See infra Part IV.A (proposing an amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2012)). 
166 See infra Part IV.B (addressing the counterarguments to this Note’s proposed 
amendment). 
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exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place 
in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred. 
(c) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.—No action shall be 
maintained under this section unless it is commenced 
within 10 years after the cause of action arose. 
(d) ENJOINING SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN 
VIOLATION OF THE LEAHY LAW.—An individual who is 
the victim of a gross violation of human rights committed by a 
unit of the security forces of a foreign country that is under 
consideration for assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act 
or the Arms Export Control Act may bring a suit in equity to 
enforce 22 U.S.C. § 2378d (2012).167 
B. Commentary 
Leahy’s most significant shortcoming, uneven enforcement, could be 
remedied through a simple, yet powerful, statutory cure:  a private cause 
of action to enforce Leahy.  Leahy has prevented security assistance from 
reaching abusive units of the security forces and spurred accountability 
for human rights abuses in Indonesia, Honduras, Guatemala, Colombia, 
Bangladesh, and Nigeria.168  However, in some of these same countries, 
Leahy was unable to bar security assistance to units of the security forces 
allegedly responsible for gross violations of human rights.169  Leahy is a 
relatively new statute, and Congress has recognized the need to perfect it 
and has been willing to do so.170  Expanding the power to enforce Leahy 
                                                
167 The proposed legislation would be passed as an amendment to the TVPA.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1350 note (2012).  The TVPA currently has three sections; however, § 1 provides the title of 
the statute and § 3 provides statutory definitions.  Id.  The proposed amendment would be 
enacted at the end of the current § 2.  The regular portion of the text comes from 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1350 note (2012).  The italicized portion of the text represents the additions made by the 
author. 
168 See supra Part II.B (describing Leahy’s successes in prohibiting the distribution of U.S. 
security assistance to foreign security forces with abusive human rights records and spurring 
accountability for human rights abuses). 
169 See supra Part II.B (discussing Leahy’s enforcement failures). 
170 See § 2378d (representing Leahy in its current form).  Leahy was first passed in 1997 and 
was substantially amended numerous times since then.  See SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 34, 
at 3–4 (describing the original Leahy enactment and the subsequent amendments to the law).  
After initially appearing two decades ago as an amendment to the Foreign Operations 
Appropriations legislation and applying only to funds channeled through the State 
Department, Leahy has been annually added to the Defense Appropriations legislation, 
codified, and amended.  See Pub. L. No. 113-76, § 7034(l), 128 Stat. 515 (2014) (amending 
Leahy to clarify terms and provide guidance on vetting); Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 7034(k), 125 
Stat. 1216 (2011) (modifying Leahy to define the “credible information” requirement and 
requiring unit vetting when considering training an individual); Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 651, 
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beyond the State Department could serve to pressure the State 
Department toward more effective enforcement while also ensuring 
egregious enforcement failures can be remedied through the courts. 
Critics may argue that subjecting the executive branch’s foreign 
security assistance decisions to judicial review violates constitutional 
separations of powers and ties the hands of policymakers attempting to 
deal with national security threats.  However, providing victims of human 
rights abuses the opportunity to challenge a State Department 
determination in federal court is a procedural, rather than substantive, 
change.  Enhanced Leahy enforcement via judicial review would implicate 
national security no more than properly vigorous State Department 
enforcement.  Thus, any criticism that Leahy’s enforcement could 
undermine policymakers’ ability to address national security must be 
addressed in the statutory scheme itself, rather than by attacking the 
enforcement mechanics.  Thus far, such arguments have been 
unpersuasive to Congress.171  Moreover, creating a private cause of action 
to enjoin the State Department to enforce Leahy would provide for more 
uniform enforcement of Leahy without radically changing Congress’s 
approach to human rights enforcement or subjecting foreign affairs 
determinations to judicial scrutiny. 
First, Congress has already recognized the importance of a judicial 
remedy for the victims of human rights abuses committed abroad.172  The 
TVPA created a private cause of action for damages in U.S. courts for the 
victims of torture and extrajudicial killings committed abroad against 
foreign individuals.173  The human rights abuses subject to claims under 
the TVPA, torture and extrajudicial killings, already closely mirror the 
violations subject to Leahy scrutiny.174  Allowing a U.S. court that can 
                                                
121 Stat. 2341 (2007) (codifying Leahy); Pub. L. No. 105-262, § 8130, 112 Stat. 2279 (1998) 
(containing a Leahy provision applicable to Defense Department appropriations). 
171 See Human Rights Vetting Hearing, supra note 43, at 13–15 (statement of Lauren Ploch 
Blanchard, Specialist in African Affairs, Congressional Research Service) (noting the 
criticisms of Leahy restricting security assistance by executive branch officials, including 
officials from the Defense Department, and members of Congress). 
172 See  § 1350 note (2012) (establishing a private cause of action to redress human rights 
abuses, such as torture and extrajudicial executions, committed abroad); see also supra Part 
II.C (describing the TVPA’s private cause of action providing a civil damages remedy to 
victims of human rights abuses abroad). 
173 See § 1350 note (creating a private cause of action for victims of human rights abuses); 
see also supra Part II.C (detailing the TVPA’s private cause of action). 
174 Compare DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 41, at 7 (providing a statutory definition for 
gross violation of human rights), with § 1350 note (defining torture and extrajudicial killing).  
Leahy does not include a definition of gross violation of human rights; therefore, the State 
Department applies § 2304’s definition.  DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 41, at 7.  Thus, a 
gross violation of human rights is “torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment[;] prolonged detention without charges and trial[;] causing the disappearance 
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award damages to a victim under TVPA to consider a suit to enjoin further 
security assistance to the security forces responsible for the violations if 
that assistance violated Leahy would provide a more complete remedy for 
the victim. 
Second, a private action to enforce Leahy would not represent an 
undue interference in foreign affairs in violation of the political question 
doctrine.  The Supreme Court has clarified that congressional 
authorization of judicial review of military and national security affairs 
eliminates the barriers generally erected to protect these areas of executive 
branch authority.175  Therefore, if Congress creates a private cause of 
action to enforce Leahy, the political question doctrine should not present 
an obstacle, as Congress has authorized the court’s consideration of the 
question.176 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Leahy has significantly outperformed its predecessor, § 2304, in 
withholding U.S. security assistance to human rights abusers.  However, 
the State Department has failed to fully enforce Leahy.  Enforcement gaps 
                                                
of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons[;] other flagrant 
denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of person (e.g. extrajudicial killing); [and] 
[p]olitically-motivated rape.”  DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 41, at 7.  The TVPA applies 
to extrajudicial killings and torture.  § 1350 note.  The Act defines an extrajudicial killing as 
“a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly 
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable 
by civilized peoples.”  § 1350 note.  The Act defines torture as 
[A]ny act, directed against an individual in the offender’s custody or 
physical control, by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or 
suffering arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to, lawful 
sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that 
individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third 
person information or a confession, punishing that individual for an act 
that individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of 
having committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or a third 
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind; and 
mental pain or suffering [caused violence or the threat of violence]. 
Id. 
175 See Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (acknowledging that review of 
national security and foreign affairs is justiciable when Congress has specifically authorized 
judicial review); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 575 (2d Cir. 2009) (clarifying that barriers to 
judicial review of foreign policy and national security matters, such as the political question 
doctrine, are eliminated by congressional authorization of judicial review). 
176 See Dep’t of the Navy, 484 U.S. at 530 (holding that the traditional judicial deference to 
“the authority of the [e]xecutive [branch] in military and national security affairs” is not an 
obstacle to judicial review of these matters when “Congress specifically has provided 
otherwise”); Arar, 585 F.3d at 575 (recognizing that judicial review of foreign policy and 
national security matters is possible when Congress so authorizes). 
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have allowed foreign security forces accused of gross violations of human 
rights access to U.S. security assistance, including the Colombian brigade 
responsible for the San José de Apartadó massacre. 
Amendments aimed at perfecting Leahy have provided measureable 
improvements in enforcement and aggressive congressional oversight has 
provided a corrective for enforcement gaps.  However, amendments to 
Leahy’s procedures cannot eliminate all risk of enforcement gaps and ad-
hoc congressional oversight is not an effective solution.  For victims of 
abusive security forces and taxpayers concerned with seeing lethal U.S. 
security assistance in the hands of abusive militaries, the stakes are simply 
too high to rely exclusively on the State Department for Leahy 
enforcement. 
By incorporating a private cause of action to enforce Leahy to the 
remedies already available to human rights victims under the TVPA, 
Congress could empower victims and democratize Leahy oversight.  
Imagine the outcome if the victims of the San José de Apartadó massacre 
had been able to file suit in a U.S. court to enjoin U.S. security assistance 
to the Seventeenth Brigade.  The power of a private cause of action in the 
hands of the victims may have spared the U.S. government the 
embarrassment of funding a Colombian army unit that brutally massacred 
eight civilians, including three children.  More importantly, it could have 
pressured the Colombian government to more swiftly bring the 
perpetrators to justice.  The amendment proposed herein would have 
opened the doors of federal courts to human rights victims to assist the 
government in barring U.S. security assistance to foreign forces 
responsible for gross human rights violations. 
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